Newsletter - Social Science in Eastern Europe 1998-3
"Colonization or Partnership?" Comments on the Question of
East-West-Cooperation in the Social Sciences
- Jörg Becker, Solingen: Eastern/Western
Europe: Partnership or Colonization? Wrong questions and wrong answers
- Helmut Fehr, Erlangen-Nürnberg: General
cultural set-up for transformation research
- Josef Langer, Klagenfurt: Colonization
or Partnership? Commentary on a special issue of the Budapest quarterly
journal replika
- E.Z. Mirskaya, Moscow: The painful
process of transformation: What do we expect from international cooperation?
- Hans-Heinrich Nolte, Hanover: Colonization
or partnership
- Ingrid Oswald, Magdeburg: East-West-Cooperation
and the dilemma of research promotion. Comments on "AIDS in the Social
Sciences in Eastern Europe"
- Dieter Segert, Berlin/ Prague: Who is
to blame? Comments on the current debate over West-East-relationships in the
social sciences.
- Helmut Steiner, Berlin: Commentary on:
G. Csepeli, A.Oerkeny, K. L. Scheppele: Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
in Social Science in Eastern Europe
- Wolfgang Teckenberg, Heidelberg: Comparative
analysis under Eastern Europe's influence: The emergence of a "normal
scientific community"
- Christine Teichmann, Berlin: Scientific
cooperation East - West: Where is the crux in working together?
- Hellmut Wollmann, Berlin: Western
overdetermination in the Central and Eastern European social sciences
"agenda-setting"...
"So there is much confusion and miscommunication over even the most
basic elements of academic life" (S.30)
The Social Science Information Centre (IZ) began the third volume of its
documentation series "Social Sciences in the new Eastern Europe"[46] by publishing a variety of essays focused on
the controversy over East-West relations in the social sciences which had
appeared in the Hungarian replika[47].
The dispute was led by the question: "Colonization or partnership? The idea
behind publishing these contributions in an IZ newsletter has to do with the
overall goal of the Information Transfer Eastern Europe's activities, which is
to support and improve scientific communication between the East and the West.
Included therein is the goal of making apparent and dispersing background
knowledge which is of special significance in the obviously still underdeveloped
East-West communication culture. The problems addressed in the journal replika
by Eastern European social scientists in their pointed theses regarding their
perceptions of East-West cooperation structures are worth being acknowledged by
western scientists.
Indeed, the controversy published by IZ did trigger a - though mostly verbal
- response among Western readers, which again led to the idea of generating a
much broader discussion and incorporating various other viewpoints. Therefore,
IZ together with the German Society of Sociology's section "Sociology of
Eastern and Eastern-Central Europe" has mailed essays from the journal replika
to social scientists known for their familiarity with the East-West research
contexts, and has requested that they please submit a letter to the editor like
statement on the theses delineated in these contributions.
We are pleased to report that up to copy deadline, twelve scientists had
already submitted their comments, in some cases even longer evaluations. Each of
these statements focused on another aspect of the replika-theses, which
really shows the complexity of the question of East-West cooperation and the
diversity in the points of view. Since a few other East-West experts have
expressed their interest, but were presently lacking the time to contribute
their comments to this special issue, we are planning to continue the discussion
in the next series. With this special newsletter edition we are also hoping to
stimulate additional expressions of opinions with regard to the topic. We would,
therefore, like to send copies of the replika-contributions to anybody
who wishes to send in their comments to be published in the upcoming
newsletters. (Available also via Internet).
As the newsletter is available in English and also on the Internet,
both a broader view of the subject matter and a possibility for international
participation in the discussion are created.
Summary of the replika-contributions:
Although the following printed statements could be easily comprehended
without knowledge of the "replika-contributions", especially
when referred to the question of "colonization or partnership", we
would like to begin our presentation with a few central theses from the five replika-contributions
in order to facilitate for the statements to be placed in the right context.
The introductory contribution by G. Csepeli, A. Örkeny and K.L. Scheppele
entitled "Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome in Social Science in Eastern
Europe" initially marks the change in the post 1989 Eastern European
science systems as the fall of the publicly financed research system in every
respect: the development is considered a succession of institutional, individual
and scientific losses.
The initial hope for new scientific activity was followed by the shock
triggered off by the increasing deterioration of domestic research conditions.
In a parallel fashion, the change of western research and research policy
regarding Eastern Europe is viewed as a mutation from wolf (anti-Communist
research motivation) to sheep (empirical social research with a mere interest in
data), with the great international data programs as "Big Science"
exercising a considerable influence on this development. The economically weak
status of the Eastern European science further facilitated the
"invasion" by western researchers with their rich research funds into
the Eastern European research field. They brought along their own research
topics and methods and abused those Eastern European scientists so badly in need
of recources as servants for their own research. Not only did the varying nature
of the self-conceptions of eastern and western intellectuals seriously interfere
with scientific communication, but it also hardened the image of scientific
inferiority and superiority respectively. Hence, the vast Eastern European
research potentials that partially had developed in the social sciences even
prior to 1989, basically go to waste as far as their utilization in an equally
entitled international cooperation for the research of global problems is
concerned. Even the fact that Eastern European scientists could function as
mediators between the historical and cultural uniqueness of their respective
countries and the postmodern social science research approaches is not used in
the research on the changes and formation of new social theories.
In his comments on G. Csepeli et al., R. Andorka rejects this analysis with
his contribution "Cooperation in the Social Sciences", although
generally confirming the problematic situation of Eastern European social
science research: the decreasing wages for scientists, the requirement of a
second income, brain drain, and the lack of a new generation of researchers have
become some of the major problems in social science; the national research
funding has been continuously decreasing since 1991 (at an overall rate of 40
percent) and due to the crisis among publishers, the possibilities for
publishing are diminishing. In light of this dim prospect, he nonetheless views
the western research activities in Eastern Europe and their research findings as
a valuable support for the research on Eastern European societies, which in turn
benefits the Eastern European sciences. He basically distinguishes four
different forms of western research activities in Eastern Europe and in each
case points out the inherent chances for cooperation for Eastern Europeans. In
his point of view, every single form of cooperation bears the chance of creating
learning effects significant for the development of a national, autonomous
science oriented towards international standards. For him the worst that could
happen would be a withdrawal of Eastern European sciences from international
cooperation.
Z. Kusa as well confirms in her contribution "The Immune Deficiency -
Acquired or Inherited?" Csepeli's analysis of the present situation of the
Eastern European social sciences and expresses her gratitude towards the authors
for having pinpointed some of the previously tacit rules of the game used in the
integration of Eastern European social sciences into the international
scientific community. On the other hand, she talks about her mixed feelings
while reading through Csepeli's article, while she in her own analysis of the
situation is not necessarily guided by the thesis of an "external
invasion", because she fears in this image the threat of "nationalist
deviations". For Kusa, there are predominantly internal factors leading to
the Eastern European scientists' undoubted willingness to play by the rules
governing international scientific cooperation. She sees both the reason and the
result in the lacking national science cooperation on which she will elaborate.
Setting empirical research (data capture) in opposition to qualitative social
research, which is inherent in Csepeli's article, and the negatively viewed
dominance of the first is something that Kusa does not consider a particular
Eastern European specialty but rather an international trend which Eastern
Europeans as well have to learn how to face and get accustomed to.
The two Americans Lemon and Altshuler and their reaction to Csepeli et al. in
their contribution "Whose Social Science Is Colonized?" is in
agreement as far as the seriousness of the Eastern social science situation is
concerned, yet critical with regard to the generalized and abstract level of the
analysis. They demand a more differentiated view on western social sciences and
the representatives of their disciplines. In addition, they emphasize that some
of what Csepeli says refers to a general trend affecting both Eastern and
Western European scientists (the cutback in research moneys as well as in the
average western scientist's standard of living, etc.).
In their final paper, Csepeli et al. reply to all contributions, conceding
that in talking about the issue of East-West research cooperation, they did not
address generalized aspects such as center versus periphery or questions of
language policy, because they wanted to elaborate on the fact that Eastern
European social scientists are still structurally discriminated against, when is
comes to their chances for independent research as well as international
reputation. Again, they emphasize their criticism against the data-capturing
"Big Science" and advocate empirical investigations into the question
of how western social research impacts the development of Eastern European
research topics and methods. In summary, they conclude that above all, there is
a lack of communication among Eastern Europeans about this issue and that a
discussion regarding these questions is long overdue.
(Society for Communication and Technology Research)
In the fall of 1995, two political analysts, Fritz Vilmar and Wolfgang
Duemcke of West Berlin, published a book called "Colonization of the
GDR"[48]. This omnibus volume contains
findings from a four-year project, the focus of which was a critical analysis of
the German unification between 1991 and 1995, which also produced alternatives
to the kind of unification.
Vilmar and Duemcke came up with the following conclusions:
* There was never an equally entitled participation of East Germans in the
unification process, since they were never given the opportunity of a
referendum.
* Under conditions of time pressure during the events, the political parties
in the new Federal states did not have a chance to engage in a self-determined
process of democratic reorientation.
* The political actors in Bonn and Berlin mistook the East German
population's majority decision for West German affluence and democratic standard
as a carte blanche for the transfer of the entire West German spheres of life
into united Germany's East.
* Not only was the GDR political cadre removed from all executive functions,
but also a large proportion of the academic and functional elite in
administration, industry and science. While in 1989, there were 140.567
full-time employees in research and development in the GDR, the number of those
fully employed had gone down to only 23.600 (16,8 percent) by the beginning of
1993.
* The hasty monetary union without back-up measures marked the beginning of a
de-industrialization process in the GDR.
* The East German economy already burdened with previous debts and a proviso
for property encouraged the de-industrialization.
* The trust company's privatization policy failed completely. Contrary to its
legal assignment of redeveloping and privatizing East German enterprises, the
East German companies were undersold. Most buyers came from West Germany and,
through these purchases, were able to destroy the potential competitiveness of
East German companies. The Central Investigation Office for White-Collar Crime
estimated the damage caused by white-collar criminals in 1996 to be in the area
of 26 billion marks.
* The labor market policy has not been further developed and directed towards
a second national labor market, but is increasingly reduced instead. The
official unemployment rate of approximately 20 percent in all of East Germany
means for a lot of regions an unemployment rate of 30, even 50 percent. This
also produces in many crisis regions a drift to the cities, alcoholism and
political extremism, in short: growing impoverishment and a lack of future.
Company insolvency in East Germany was much higher than in West Germany. Whereas
Hesse in 1996 was with 86 of 10.000 companies at the top of the list for company
bankruptcy in West Germany, there were 188 cases of insolvency for every 10.000
firms in Saxony, 245 in Brandenburg, and 165 in Thuringia.
* Die vast public transfer funds from the West to the East have to be
assessed with more than scepticism and ambivalence.
1. Larger financial sums would have been necessary to prevent East Germany's
present economic crisis.
2. A large portion of this transfer was not utilized for investments but was
used to avert further social and infrastructural mismanagement.
3. For every 100 German marks spent in the East for consumer goods,
investment goods or services, 56 marks went back to the West or a foreign
country. In other words or put more drastically: Public funds from West Germany
were flowing via the East market back to the West of the republic as private
profits.
So far the research findings according to the two political scientists Vilmar
and Duemcke.
These findings and statements may seem alien to social scientists from
Eastern and Central Europe, just simply because from their perspective they
argue that firstly, the former GDR's transformations process has to be judged in
a different way than that of the former Comecon-states and that secondly, the
former GDR due to the immensely prosperous West Germany has had a unique
starting advantage compared to the former Comecon-states. In other words: The
"colonization" debate does not just exist between Eastern and Western
Europe but also within Germany, when it comes to the dispute over the
unification quality of the two German states.
The authors presented the following definition: "The fact of
colonization comprises more than the processes of the world-wide European
expansion from the 16th to the 19th century. In its core, colonization means the
political, economic and cultural dominance of one social system in relation to
another."[49]
In a paper following the book [50], the
authors defend the notion of "colonization" by stating that the
"existing phenomena of structural dominance " is decisive for the
choice of the term; besides, even feminist sociology talks about the
"internal colonization" of women under patriarchy.
The problem with Vilmar's and Duemcke's work is not that they speak of
dominance, de-industrialization and white-collar crime as well as impoverishment
and economic crisis. In my work on the changes in the new Federal states'
information economy [51] as well as in my works
on the mass media changes in Eastern and Central Europe[52], I myself have used similar terms and concepts. Even if
there are, indeed, "problems of structural dominance" between East and
West Germany, between East and Central Europe, it is still not justified to use
the term "colonization".
With the Algerian physician, psychoanalyst and anti-colonial revolutionary
theorist Frantz Fanon and his "Peau noire, masques blancs" (1952)[53], one may point out that the
master-servant-relationship in colonialism discussed by G. W. F. Hegel in his
"Phenomenology of the Mind" (1807) has a different quality than the
relationship of dependence or dominance between two European industrial nations.
One can agree with Frantz Fanon, when he emphasizes that according to Hegel,
exploitation is an immanent factor in the (inner-European)
master-servant-relationship, however, Hegel integrates the momentum of
mutuality. In colonialism, however, the master "does not give a damn about
the servant's awareness. He does not care for his acceptance, he wants his
labor."[54] To make it more clear,
paraphrasing Fanon: Colonialism is not just about exploitation, it is always
about double exploitation, and in this relationship the servant is not merely a
slave but a thing, an object; the doubly exploited individual is made an object,
an animal.
In summary, the term "colonialism" cannot be used in the
description of the dependent relationship between Eastern/Central and Western
Europe for the following reasons:
1. Comparing the two dependent relationships represents a formal and
ahistorical approach. One has to insist on the specific gain of knowledge with
respect to historically determined forms of power, governance and violence.
2. Comparing the two dependent relationships represents a theoretical and a
qualitatively non-applicable approach. Actually, the comparison would result in
the playing down of the conditions of exploitation regarding the North-South
dimension.
Since two decades, terms such as "transformation" or
"structural change" are in great demand in the social sciences.
However, in a normatively defined science, they have the semantic disadvantage
of not giving evidence about the quality and direction of the change. Instead,
for the new relationship between Eastern/Central and Western Europe, one could
possibly use terms such as "seizure" or "occupation". Both
these new terms, which are not specifically defined by social science, might be
used to describe the new phenomena in the Comecon-states' transitions better
than terms belonging to a different context.
(University of Erlangen-Nürnberg, Social Science Research Center)
The controversy initiated by Csepeli, Örkeny and Scheppele is not remarkable
due to only the accusation of "colonization". Even more revealing are
the problems addressed by the authors (in a polemic way even): general cultural
conditions that are of central significance for the comparative research on
transforming societies. The fact that especially in the beginnings, specific
cultural features and comparative aspects were neglected, becomes clear in the
stocktaking of (German-language) research literature.
For these shortcomings three factors, all bound up with each other, can be
stated:
1. "Western", in particular West German social scientists have
failed to take the turning point in 1989 as a chance to check their usual models
of analysis whether they could possibly be applied to the multi-level processes
of radical social and cultural change. More common, on the contrary, has been
the schematic transfer of the usual analyses, as the Hungarian philosopher and
social scientist G. Bence critically stated as early as 1990.
2. Most social scientists, who saw in the transformation research of
post-communist societies after 1989 the possibilities of opening up new
financial resources and research fields, neither had the language skills nor the
regional or cultural background with respect to the former real-socialist
countries. No more than the majority of western social scientists had specific
knowledge about the historical and comparative research on communist countries
prior to 1989. At the same time, anthropological case studies such as by Janine
Wedel ("The Private Poland") or Steven Sampson ("The Informal
Sector in Eastern Europe") offered important information for the
understanding of the conditions underlying the processes of transformation.
3. After nine years of transformation research, western and in particular
West German social scientists are confronted with problems resulting from
exactly these shortcomings in the beginning phase of transformation research:
The failure to consolidate the historical conditions and cultural set-up of the
institutional change, the non-simultaneousness of the political, economic and
cultural modernization processes and the growing crisis in the transformation
societies make the reflection of the underlying models of analysis necessary.
Instead of having premature expectations with regard to an overall stocktaking
theory, an analytical, reconstructing research perspective would be more
appropriate; an investigative perspective focusing on the multi-level cultural
and social processes of change in conjunction with their respective historical
and country-specific conditions; a research perspective which does not come up
with the mere quantity of eight, ten or fourteen countries, but rather
supplements its computer-assisted view on data pertaining to the political and
institutional changes with some intensive case studies. In other words:
Transformation research is about comparative empirical social research using the
theoretical and methodical experiences provided by sociologists from countries
such as Poland and Hungary, who were able to gather these experiences in their
expert groups prior to 1989 through the research on changes taking place in the
final stage of "real socialism". As Westerners or West Germans, we are
required to take a look at the tendencies of change within the post-communist
societies, a perspective not loaded by schematic terminological pairs such as
"premodern" and "modern" or that feed on the continuation of
common theories such as the assumption of a "continuing
modernization". Otherwise, the western or West German social science
invariably is confronted with an accusation widespread after 1989: the inability
to predict and analyze complex processes of social change. It is correct that a
prediction of radical social change as in 1989 could not be expected from the
social sciences. Less out of place, however, is to expect social sciences to
come up with some theoretically and empirically sound post 1989 interpretations
for the ongoing transformations processes. Yet for this, western social
scientists require in my point of view the capability to engage in
"intercultural communication" with their Eastern European fellow
researchers. The Hungarian scientist's articles are hinting at that fact.
(University of Klagenfurt, Institute for Sociology)
Replika's 1996 special issue is dedicated to the relationships of western
social scientists to post-communist societies. The provocative question in the
title is "Colonization or Partnership?". In their responses, the
different authors harshly and very openly criticize the so-called West. In fact,
the relationships are described much more as colonization rather than
partnership. Following the invitation by the Social Science Information Centre (IZ),
I would like to take the occasion to comment on these contributions, even if the
letter to the editor setting seems much too limited in order to meet the
subject. Nevertheless, an attempt shall be made, in which I will write down some
personal experiences, comment on the text and present some structural plausible
thoughts.
Personal experiences
In the early Seventies, it was still very difficult to obtain social science
information from the former Eastern bloc. Very common were correspondences
officially labeled as "stamp exchange", however, serving different
purposes. This way I was able to obtain important sociological literature on the
Soviet cadre and the USSR's social structure from a staff person at the
Novosibirsk library at a time, when I was still a student. In return, I paid for
the annual subscription of a German language journal.
For established scientists or research institutions, there were even then
better opportunities for cooperation. There was, for instance, the Vienna Center
founded in 1964, which played a strategic role and was financed and supervised
by eastern and western states on equal terms. This coordination office was
closed in 1989 due to the possibility of direct relations from thereon. I myself
have participated for many years in an East-West project since 1975. One of the
major differences compared to post 1989 was that in those times, the
participants and their institutions were entirely equal, which lead
interaction-wise to a completely partnership-like relationship inspite of the
western team being slightly superior in terms of their methodical and
theoretical accomplishments. You had to be aware in the West that only by
carefully cultivating these relationships, you were able to have access to data
and information. Switching to different partners was practically impossible,
because in a Communist system, decisions with regard to scientific cooperation
were made centrally. Aside from modern technology (computer, telephone), the
Eastern partners were well equipped. All of their research conventions were
always perfectly organized and for many Western colleagues a special event. Very
often these conventions took place in the relaxed and mysterious atmosphere of
old castles; excellent dinners were natural, liveried waiters common. After
1989, these convenient sides of the East-West cooperation crumbled away fast. At
the same time, the relationships became more chaotic; one could feel the
asymmetries all of a sudden. Which didn't mean that the Eastern partners were
left without financial means. I know of a lot of projects that were able to
exist without western help. Yet, cooperation, information and data have become
more expensive and risky, for instance day trips that cost more than comparable
conventions in the West. Despite independent project financing in the East,
there is a high pressure that expenses should come out of the individuals'
pockets. One can feel that the status security from the Communist era is lost.
Unlike before, business trips to the East are connected with considerable
personal risks not to be underestimated. Several colleagues of mine had their
cars stolen, one of the most remarkable example being the Dean's Mercedes that
vanished from a guarded parking lot of an Eastern partner university.
I would like to also mention that according to my experience, the chance for
cooperation nowadays is being distributed in a much more equal fashion than was
the case under the communist rule. The cooperation with Poland, Hungary and
Yugoslavia was least critical; the one with Czechoslovakia, however, was nearly
impossible towards the end. One could get the impression, there were no social
scientists in that country. The situation with the GDR was not any better. In
both cases, any attempt to establish a contact became a conspiracy matter.
Letters were delivered by private couriers, obviously out of fear that they
might be caught by the secret service.
The fellow researchers from the various communist countries had different
scientific strengths. Among the Polish scientists, there were many brilliant
theorists, the Hungarians were able to shine with their political analyses, and
the Yugoslavian colleagues were fairly good methodists. Until today, this has
not really changed much. I find this to be important to mention, because in the
replika-contributions much is said about Eastern Europe in a very general sense
only.
Comments on the text
Six of the 19 authors in the replika issue are from the USA or associated
with an American university, respectively. The Czech and Slovak Republics and
Rumania are represented with one contribution each. The majority of articles
were written by Budapest sociologists. Western European positions or
contributions from Germany, Italy or Austria are missing. Thus, replika's
analyses and viewpoints can certainly not be directly applied to Western Europe.
In the first place, the contributions reflect experiences with the USA and
the social sciences there, which is especially expressed in the contribution by
Csepeli et al., in which they overstate the colonization thesis. Relationships
with the social sciences in the geographically closer neighboring states are not
mentioned. There is only a reference to the EU-TEMPUS-program, but in a way that
can hardly be used as evidence for colonization. It is criticized that the
southern EU-states are evidently nipping off money that actually Eastern and
Central Europe is entitled to receive.
Structural plausibility
"Colonization or Partnership?" To be honest, everyone assumes that
there is only partnership when the relationship is mutual, i.e. when each
participant can offer something attractive to the other. One will have to check
whether that is true for
the East-West-relations in the social sciences. Up to 1989, such cooperations
were of high political (system confrontation) and scientific (system comparison)
value.
In the transformation euphoria following 1989 - and that's what the replika-authors
are reflecting on - all individuals and groups made an attempt to explore the
ins and outs of what might be possible. Like Ferenc Glatz of the Hungarian
Academy of Sciences put it in the last special issue of the "Wiener
Institut für den Donauraum und Mitteleuropa (IDM)" (Vienna Institute for
the Danube region and Central Europe), quite rational and without any moralizing
undertone: "One of the major disappointments with respect to our illusions
is the fact that for Hungarian society western integration was not an aid
program but a forced modernization." Obviously, this applies to the social
sciences as well.
After the turn, in the early Nineties, the 'modernizers', however,
predominantly came from the United States and not from Western Europe. The only
exception was the GDR, which is noticeable from the replika-authors'
criticism. The foundation of the Central European University in Prague, Warsaw,
or Budapest is only one of many examples. Books and equipment were shipped
across the Atlantic to the East by the ton. Some of it was not up to date, which
occasionally was noticed by the recipients, and they were quite touchy about it
("As if we had just climbed down from the trees."). But even without
such developments, one could easily imagine the kind of potential friction.
Initially, the hopes which some of the Eastern and Central European
intellectuals placed in the United States were over the top. One tends to
compare their situation with that of Western Europe during the Fifties and
Sixties. Not long ago, for instance, the positive answer to the question
"Been in America?" was the deciding factor in many academic careers at
German universities. As far as the basic scientific positions are concerned that
are also playing a significant role in replika's discussion, there was
just recently a sharp controversy between the German sociologist Muench and the
American Alexander in the announcements of "Theory and Society" by the
ISA. The Americans felt provoked by Muench's contribution on the last World
Congress of Sociologists in Bielefeld. And with this the subject has not been
closed. On the joint Sociology Congress this year by the German, Austrian and
Swiss Society for Sociology, there is a separate program called
"Americanization of the German-language Sociology after 1945?"
Finally, some thoughts on the observation, why Western Europe is
scientifically and culturally less present in the reform states than is North
America. I think, this might have something to do with the following factors: a)
Western Europe's science and culture is still, albeit much less today than 10
years ago, oriented towards the nation state, which basically results in a
decreased motivation for international cooperation. b) Often, not Western Europe
but the USA is the model for the post-communist societies. In their status
thinking, 'Soviet Union' simply became `USA'. This is highly supported by the
still centralist traits of these societies. c) Cooperation requires appropriate
language skills. As far as language skills exist, the social science
intelligentsia in the East speaks English. That alone promotes more of a contact
with North America than with multi-language Western Europe. d) In the Unites
States, there are numerous universities and research institutes, in which
immigrants from Eastern Europe play a greater role. It is they, who sometimes
take the deciding steps in the initiative for cooperation.
For the future social science cooperation between Eastern and Western Europe,
I consider two developments to be important:
1) The EU science programs and
2) the growth of international research networks.
It is predominantly the European Union who would be able to relieve the
financial problems of the post-communist research structures. Due to the EU-programs'
political background, the colonization tendencies described in replika
could possibly be more reduced than in the rather chaotic relations with the
American social sciences after 1989. Giving up nation-state oriented research
hierarchies for the benefit of creating networks, in which scientists from
different countries work together on equal terms, is already a common phenomenon
in the social sciences today, strengthening the positions of the colleagues from
the post-communist societies. It suddenly enables a cooperation that was not
possible before, not even with their former allies, because of their orientation
in the nation state. In this scenario, the Eastern and Central Europeans
themselves have to take the initiative, more than has been the case before,
since in the course of the "normalization" of the societal relations,
there may no longer be a particular reason for a Western European or American
scientist to do research on a country of the former Eastern bloc. In that sense,
the fear of colonization would be obsolete, by the same token, however, the hope
for partnership.
(Russian Academy of Sciences, Institute for the History of Science and
Technology, Sociology of Science Department)
The contribution by G. Csepeli, A. Oerkeny and K.L. Scheppele has without
doubt played a positive role, because it brought up a topic for public
discussion that has been continuously and repeatedly discussed amongst Eastern
European scientists. The great number of participants and the vividness of the
discussion proves how much this problem is of current interest. The painful
period of transformation and the crisis situation in the sciences have left
their marks on Russia; the Russian colleagues know the authors' sentiments and
emotions all too well. However, it seems to me, a lot of their ideas, judgements
and conclusions do not really evolve out of the results of an objective analysis
of the real situation, but in light of the outcome rather from some deep
disappointment due to the long-awaited social changes. The contribution is
appealing to the reader's emotions rather than rational mind, which is really
its strength as well as its weakness.
I am personally against the article's intention to blame the situation that
the Eastern European sciences and scientists are in, on external factors. This
became clear in the text's images and wording. Metaphors represent a stylistic
tool, in a scientific presentation, however, the metaphor is used as an
instrument to gain knowledge, and this may result in an existing similarity of
the metaphoric model and the research subject. Is that the case with the central
metaphors the authors use, "AIDS" and "colonization"?
In general, the term AIDS is associated with two notions: One is the notion
of a deadly disease carried in from the outside. The significance of the term
"acquired" emphasizes that it is a disease brought in from the
outside, occasionally affecting innocent victims. Does this apply to the
phenomenon discussed here? I believe that the "immunity deficit"
experienced by the social sciences in post-socialist countries and by their
scientists is strictly their own deficit, which has developed since decades
under conditions of a forced state ideology. The necessity to follow this
ideology, even if not shared by a large number of scientists, led to the fact
that one got used to serving foreign interests and instructions and to
tolerating corruptibility. As far as the notion of the disease's necessary
deadly outcome is concerned, it is not even shared by the authors themselves.
(Otherwise, it would not be worth while to even be concerned about the fate of
the Eastern European social sciences.)
The term "colonization" is also not sufficiently defined: The
colonial masters' efforts were always aimed at exploiting the colony over a long
period of time. Even with the situation not being the same in all of the Eastern
European countries, this metaphor can hardly be considered suitable for the
actual situation.[55] While in some countries
(such as Russia), one can verify elements of a comparable strategy with respect
to various directions in highly developed natural sciences, it still does not
apply to the social sciences. Nobody really claims our intellectual riches.
Instead, the authors made it their business to locate such intellectual goods
that might be of interest for western partners.
One can see by the chart (Best, Introduction, page 17) that Russian research
is receiving the least financial support from foreign sources. (5%) Obviously,
this contributes to maintaining the domestic scientists' national interests and
self-identification, but, of course, this also means a worsening situation, in
which research funding is not always available. However, since 1994, Russia does
have a national source for the support of social sciences financed through the
Funds of Research in the Humanities budget, which makes research money available
for the best projects in the science of history, economics, philosophy,
sociology, political science, philology, science of art, psychology, and
pedagogics. In 1998, the following projects are receiving funds from this
source:
* 1780 research projects (60636 thousand rubles, approximately ten million
US-dollars);
* 375 projects for book publishing (1,5 million dollars);
* 123 projects for scientific conventions (0,5 million dollars);
* 80 research expeditions and empirical research projects (400 thousand
dollars)
In 1997, the fund has met its obligation, almost 500 scientific monographs
were published. (Poisk, 1998)
Hence, we can conclude that so far Russian social sciences largely exist due
to national funds and therefore, have not really given up their own research
issues interesting for Russia. Naturally, issues have changed as much as the
social reality changes. In general, the correlation between the scientists'
vocational productivity and their activities with respect to international
relations is by no means obvious. As demonstrates the empirical research
performed in leading natural science institutes at the Russian Academy of
Sciences between 1995 and 1996, three different groups of scientists coexist in
the Russian academic community: Sticking out very clearly is an elitist group
consisting of the most productive experts, who are extensively involved in
international cooperation. Yet another group, less productive and with less
perspectives for their professional career, is also very active in the
international scene. Finally, one can locate another group of highly specialized
and productive scientists, who are not included at all in international
cooperation. ( Mirskaya, 1998)
The contribution's remarkable tendency of focusing on the social change's
negative outcome is, from an scientific point of view, not objective. From a
psychological perspective, it is damaging. Hurt feelings leading to such a value
change and the hurt person's position are hardly ever productive. It is, in
fact, true that the Nineties have not fulfilled our expectations and that
beautiful illusions were destroyed. However, we have talked ourselves into
believing that the radical changes would only affect the inconvenient sides of
our lives in that all good would remain and the unreachable would come on top of
that. It was us who terribly idealized Western science and its representatives.
We should not be hurt and angry at others, just because our hopes and dreams
were utopian and did not come true.
Professionally, it is time to get things straight concerning the
irreversibility of the social changes that took place and to put an end to
living in the past. Instead, we should try to shape our work and our
relationships with the scientific world community according to the new reality.
It is important to understand that the West's specific interest in the countries
of the former Eastern bloc is exhausted due to the known geo-political changes
and that this interest will not be awakened anytime soon in the near future. The
power relationship resulting from this development belongs to the past, the
respective financial position will be drastically cut, and a new generation of `Sovietologists'
will no longer exist in the future. Thus, it is important to take actions with
respect to developing easier contacts and to create a long-term interest based
on the interrelations of the cultures.
The majority of the Russian scientists is psychologically not ready for an
encounter of the two cultures. We consider our kind of knowledge and perception
to be so important, we are so heady with our "uniqueness" that we take
it for granted and expect from our foreign colleagues the effort and ability to
understand us. Not only should they understand what we write, but we expect them
to comprehend the context, and reading between the lines is sometimes more
important than the actual text. We, on the other hand, do not feel obligated to
do our part in the work, our part towards reaching a mutual understanding.
Currently, a lot of gentlefication is done in many old cities around the
country, where in addition to maintaining the historical beauty, modern
conveniences for daily life are created. I believe, it is necessary to do a
little restoration in the building of our perception, in the bizarre and
dilapidated rooms, in which only we can get around, so that the building becomes
accessible and convenient for anybody wanting to find their way. This will
really strengthen the foundation of our communication with the scientific world
community. And we have to decide for ourselves, what we want and expect from
international relationships - a truly scientific cooperation or financial aid
for our current needs. Especially the real results of the impacts that
international cooperation has on the national scientific communities should be
the subject of more detailed sociological research.
(Translated from Russian by Christine Teichmann)
References
Beschluß des Rates des Russischen Fonds für Geisteswissenschaften, Poisk
Ndeg.10(460), 28, Februar 1998,S.11,
Mirskaya, E.Z., The role of international interactions in contemporary
science in Russia, in: Science and Public Policy, 1998, Ndeg.1, S. 37- 45
(University of Hanover, History Department - Eastern European History)
Here, I would like to make a few short comments about inequality: Basically,
the essays, from the perspective of those affected, point to a
"long-term" fact:: The unequal relationship between the West and the
East structured by the different position in the system (as much as between the
large regions of the entire world) is also true for scientific relationships
(since there are no power-free dialogs). This inequality was overstated by the
dominant socialist experiment, but not called off, which I tried to explain in
the Russian case.[56]
The contributions are somewhat disappointing in the sense that the literature
on the unequal development seems to not have been received and that's why the
result of the fall of socialism appears as something that has been part of
Europe's structure since a long time: Daniel Chirot Ed.: The Origins of
Backwardness in Eastern Europe, Berkeley 1989, California UP, Miroslav Hroch,
Lud'a Klusakova Ed.: Criteria and Indicators of Backwardness, Essays on uneven
Development in European History, Prague 1996 - Variant Editors (ISBN
80-900969-1-3); Tschechisch Lud'a Klusäkovä Ed.: Kriteria a Ukazatele
nerovnomemeho v'voje v evrops[yacute]ch dejinach, Praha 1997 - Seminar
obecn[yacute]ch dejin FFUK. In this context of ignorance a language is selected
reminding of student versions of the "Dependency" theory.
For Hungary, the works by Ivan Berend are relevant. His last book is
entitled: "From Periphery to Periphery" ; it was published in Berkeley
last year.
Yet Berend argues, (at least in some of his older writings, German Economic
Penetration in East Central Europe in Historical Perspective, in: Stephen E.
Hanson, Willfried Spohn (Eds.): Can Europe work? Seattle 1995 - University of
Washington Press, ISBN 0-295-97460-5, p. 129-150) that the problem is largely
economic. For my model explaining structured inequality in the system (Nolte,
H.-H.: Die eine Welt, (The one world) Abriß, 2nd edition, Hanover 1994,
Fackelträger-Verlag), the notion of competence accumulation plays a major role
(last: Competence accumulation in the world system. War, Russia and the love for
solid things, In: Eva Barloesius, Elcin Kuersat Ahlers, Hans-Peter Waldhoff et
al. (Ed.): Distanzierte Verstrickungen. Die schwierige Bindung soziologisch
Forschender an ihr Objekt. Festschrift Peter Gleichmann. Berlin 1997, p.
147-160). (Distanced involvement. Sociologists and their difficult ties to their
research object. Commemorative volume Peter Gleichmann). Proceeding from this
approach, the questions addressed in the essays are probably easier to classify
in a historical sense that it would be using an economic approach.
In the narrower sense, the question brought up by the authors is a sociology
of knowledge question. At this point, I would like to refer to assistant
professor Dr. Hans-Peter Waldhoff[57], who
dedicated his work to the problems of scientific exchange under conditions of
inequality.[58] As you can infer from the
titles, Waldhoff and his research group is working on German-Turkish
intellectual relationships which, of course, are somewhat different in nature
than those between Hungary and the West in general, but, in many respects, the
communication problems are also similar.
(University of Magdeburg, Institute for Sociology)
The contribution by Csepeli, Oerkeny and Scheppele on the colonization of the
Eastern European research structures through the West, which the authors have
described using the image of an "AIDS-infection", deserves to be taken
seriously. Despite the polemic sharpness and occasional contradictions, which
the previous commentators already pointed out, it focuses on some sensitive
issues that other Eastern European scientists are also aware of, yet never
articulated in public as efficiently as these authors did. In recent years
during my project work, and I can only refer to this particular department of
scientific production, I myself was confronted with open or hidden questions
concerning my role and interests in the one or the other research project. In
the following, I would like to select three aspects that repeatedly emerged in
the internal project discussions and, so I assume, won't lose their problematic
nature in the short run.
1. Who is defining the issues? Naturally, the question regarding the power of
definition does not only concern the project topics, but also the underlying
theories and specific problem contexts, which are the ones in the first place
allowing certain phenomena to be subject to scientific discussion and to be of
scientific significance once the project has ended. In fact, for most of the
Russian scientists in the beginning years of cooperation some approaches were
hard to understand, and yet, one had to use exactly these approaches in order to
receive project funding. To many of the western researchers the constraints put
upon scientific institutions seemed unreasonable, because the field of
"Eastern Europe" was just beginning to structure itself and the
'interesting' did not always correspond with the 'possible'. On the other hand,
the progressing transformation solved a lot of the problems. Many new research
areas evolved, with their methodological and theoretical forerunners in the
West, but nevertheless geared towards the specific contexts that western
partners have acknowledged and wish to acknowledge, such as election research,
the research on new social movements as well as new conceptions of ethnicity and
ethnic conflicts.
2. One related problem affecting western researchers and Russian researchers
alike are the conditions of financing. In a nutshell, yet still accurate, the
situation can be summarized as follows: the Federal Republic's research funding
financed through grants is divided up into domestic and foreign funding, very
rarely does it mean international project funding. Therefore, two scenarios are
common: In the case of scenario one, financing is predominantly granted to
domestic applicants, whereas Russian project researchers are only entitled to
modest pay. In cases where they function as mere information or data collectors
and this fits their images, this may not pose a problem. As soon as they have a
different opinion with regard to what their actual contribution to the project
is, or if they, as is the case once in a while, point out how much groundwork
they accomplished, then an equally entitled cooperation is complicated if not
entirely impossible. Scenario two earmarks the funding for Russian participants,
for instance, through special grants, while at the same time the domestic
project director or the organizers, respectively, are not included in the
funding and, therefore, the circle of those willing to go for that is very
small. The few researchers that are willing to carry through time and energy
consuming projects without pay, are interested in fast publications,
understandably as a compensation, and in this process, the Russian partners are
many times falling behind. Research funding treating both parties as equal
partners, is extremely rare. It actually has been the Volkswagen Foundation, and
this ought to be mentioned here, which has acknowledged this problem. And yet,
Russia has almost exclusively grant-funded project research, because as we know,
universities are not able to raise the money. Each single research project
becomes, on the German part, a costly logistic enterprise, before one can
proceed to the actual project work.
Project funding through European scientific institutions, such as INTAS and
TACIS, to name a few, are a different story altogether. Although their goal of
supporting multilateral project cooperations is worth acknowledging, it takes an
enormous organizational effort preceded by a complicated application procedure.
Nobody really is willing to go through all that effort, especially when for
project directors there is no funding available except for travel expenses. Yet,
the Russian partners are receiving low compensation for their sophisticated
work, which is the reason why, on the one hand, there has been a certain amount
of exhaustion on both sides, on the other hand, it is only this kind of funding
that might be able to achieve a real international network, and it is,
therefore, highly desired.
3. This leads to the question as to what category of western social
researcher we are actually talking about, a question already addressed in
Lemon's and Altshuler's comments. It's obvious that the travelling world bank
and consultation firm consultants work under different conditions than academic
researchers. And, time and again, there are enough examples of superficial
scientific tourism, where high-salaried people without the necessary language
skills travel to Russian research centers, stuff themselves with information
only to use it for their own publications, without ever fully acknowledging
their consultants. This has nothing to do with the solid research I am talking
about, because that one is hard labor often resulting in months of not or hardly
funded travel to the respective country. It is predominantly sustained by
researchers in middle-range positions suffering less from the pressure to be
present but under pressure to publish, and for whom grant-funded research is a
means of subsistence. Not only do they have to budget their project funds, they
also have to pay for conferences themselves, while their Russian partners are
being invited. While this makes sense, because considering average financial
means, Russian researchers are clearly disadvantaged, the participating German
partners are oftentimes also not the wealthiest. This asymmetric relationship
is, by the way, institutionally already manifested in many of the preparatory
steps, even before the projects starts; there are less financial aid loan
programs for German students in Russia than there are for Russian students at
German universities. Even the internships in the social sciences are only
promoted for the Russian side.
The East-West-cooperation has become a tough business, all the more as there
are two simultaneous processes having a fatal impact. Whereas the interest in
the research on Eastern Europe continues to go down (which was never as vital
with respect to Russia compared to the other Eastern and Central European
states), the amount of project researchers increases due to the inexpressible
devastating university situation, and who are now competing with each other, as
the market for grant-funded research grows increasingly smaller. This situation
is not helpful to an equal cooperation, which is the reason why articles as the
ones from the Hungarian scientists are so necessary. They, however, should also
be aware of the constraints forced upon the other side.
(Humboldt-University of Berlin, Institute for Social Sciences/ Charles
University , Institute for Europe Studies)
The discussion in the Hungarian journal replika, which was republished
in volume 3 of "Social Sciences in the new Eastern Europe" [59], is clearly of current nature. In the form of
an essay and deliberately provocative, as the authors Csepeli, Oerkeny and
Scheppele emphasize, (p. 49), the discussion highlights important post 1989
working conditions in the social sciences. To cut a long story short, the issue
is about the way Eastern European social scientists deal with their clearly
worsening working conditions and what kind of role both scientists and financial
funds coming from the West play in today's Eastern European research landscape.
The arguments do not have to be repeated. In the following, I wish to present
just a few comments based on my own experiences in the cooperation with Eastern
European fellow researchers in research and teaching.
1. The most instructive of all articles I find the one by Zusanna Kusa of the
Slovak Republic; it is more cautious but analytically accurate. In her
stocktaking she agrees with the three authors in the introductory essay, yet has
her own emphasis. It helps that she refrains from using "strong
images" such as the one of the fatal disease brought in by the European
colonialists infecting the Indians. The major point she focuses on is the decay
of her own scientific community, because that is the actual reason why new
topics for scientific discussions are being carried in from outside. (p. 40,
compare for Hungary : p. 56) The research is fragmented and highly specialized,
because it has, predominantly due to the lack of domestic financing, become a
part of western projects, in which Slovak researchers are playing a subordinate
role, collecting research data. I have similar experiences, but I also see
opposite tendencies deserving to be mentioned: there are new attempts to
re-establish social science communities both in various countries and regions
across states. I myself have noticed that joint conferences for political
scientists in Eastern-Central Europe (Hungary, Austria, Croatia, Slovenia, Czech
and Slovak Republics, and Poland) are beginning to take place on a regular basis
now, the most recent being the one just organized by the Croat Political Science
Association this past winter. At the same time there are some successful project
managers from Eastern Europe, of whom the Hungarian political scientist Attila
Agh is one of the most renowned. However, it is correct that these
inner-regional activities are only being achieved due to the promotion through
Western funds.
2. This isn't necessarily a blame. The East is highly dependable on this aid,
and, according to my experience, the various western financers (public funds,
private and party foundations) do promote these autonomous networks directed by
East Europeans in a very generous fashion, of course without losing sight of
their own goals, like, for example, the Soros-Foundation fighting an ideological
battle for an "open society". Regardless of the political intentions,
there is a benefit for Eastern Europeans. In the introductory article by Csepeli
et al., however, the authors unjustifiably and in a very generalizing fashion,
contend that Eastern Europeans won't have any long-term benefit from this, that
no infrastructure (libraries, computer technology) has been created, and that
except for the financial compensation, the individual researcher has experienced
hardly any advantage. One probably could falsify this thesis by empirical
analyses. Let me tell you from a few of my experiences: Where I am presently
working as visiting professor, at the Institute for International Studies at
Charles University in Prague, large sums from the German Academic Exchange
Service's and British Council's financial aid programs have also flown into
infrastructural facilities to support libraries and computer technology. Worth
mentioning are also the variety of scholarships granted to researchers of
different age levels from Central and Eastern Europe. The qualifications
acquired by the respective researchers are not really of short-term value, but
may help improve the conditions and quality of the scientific work at the
respective institutes. The problem, however, of "brain-drain"
addressed by Csepeli does, in fact, exist. (25).
3. This dysfunctionality in the aid process isn't created from the West's bad
intentions, although one cannot ignore that the head-hunting of young talented
people does play a part. It is also not created from, as Csepeli et al. assume,
young people in the West just learning about the specific methods and knowledge
of the West and forgetting about their Eastern European traditions and internal
views in the process. (p. 25) No, there is another basic problem involved that
strangely enough is not talked about in the articles: The reason why young
scientists after completion of their academic studies will stay in the West or
will go into industry or politics, is because the academic research
institutions' financial situation is so devastating. The financial budget means
provided by western researchers are so attractive for the Eastern European
fellow researchers for only one reason, namely, because almost all Eastern
European governments neglect the sciences. The impacts are well known and are
extensively discussed in the published articles. The most crucial point is that
even the researchers in the upper salary range are not able to live in an even
modest way. In post-socialist Eastern Europe, the standard situation for a
scientist is to have two or more long-term jobs on the side. And most disastrous
for the future is that if young scientists wish to stay in the university
system, they will most likely not be able to live off their wage. Whoever wants
to stay at the university after a successfully completed degree, will earn the
reputation of being out of touch with reality. So, in my opinion, the basic
problem is the particular post 1990 university policy considering university
education as luxury, as the cream on top of the cake, as the former Czech
premier V. Klaus has put it. The message is: If society is doing badly, one has
to eat the cake without the cream. Neo-liberal world view sees individuals
responsible for themselves and their own education, releasing state and politics
from their obligation. This also shows in the miserable wages. Everywhere, the
university salaries are kept at best just above or even below the national
average income. The conditions with respect to material supplies are not any
better. Everyday supply such as photocopying paper frequently has to be bought
from money raised through additional research funds. This was at least the case
at the Budapest ELTE and the Charles University in Prague, as colleagues of mine
have told me. The main problem, therefore, is not so much the colonialist
orientation in some western scientists, but rather the seemingly short-sighted
Eastern European democratic governmental policy, no matter whether social
democratic as in post 1994 Hungary or conservative as in the Czech Republic. It
is very likely that western-dominated institutions, such as the International
Monetary Fund with its reform recommendations and political influence are
somewhat responsible for this tragedy. Thus, a change in policy would be
absolutely essential, which would mean spending more money for university
teaching and research. Again, this also couldn't be done without further
European financial support for building up the infrastructure in the sciences.
4. Money is not always the only factor. What can be observed, is also a lack
of mental independence as a result of the post-socialist ideological vacuum. A
Hungarian co-worker of mine told me about her observation that especially former
hard-core Marxist-Leninists after the downfall of their "theoretical
love" had begun to occupy themselves with the thoughtless gathering of
facts of all sorts. They especially are designated for the role of the
previously mentioned door openers to archives or the role of data collectors in
western projects. (p. 23) There is another interesting observation of what
causes the lacking independence in the article by a Slovak woman sociologist:
the newly gained plurality doesn't go hand in hand with the differentiation
between political and scientific spheres, at least not to the same extent.
Hence, the conflicts between the parties are carried out in the guise of the
scientific dispute among social scientists. (p. 38) In political science, which
was, except for in Poland and Hungary, not established until 1989/90, one can
see yet another source for lacking independence: there is a lack of sovereign
command of international and domestic traditions within the scientific
discipline. A while ago, when I looked up the topic "History of political
thinking in Eastern Europe" in a Russian political science textbook for one
of my classes, I was able to find Weber and Parsons, but nothing on Kropotkin,
Sorokin or other Russian theorists. Of course, Lenin was missing as well.
Obviously, the poor theoretical sovereignty predominantly manifests itself in
the fact that one is painstakingly following western views. As a result, the
domestic publications are frequently detailed excerpts of important works by the
"new" classics.
Let me briefly give a summary: Political science, the social science
discipline for which I have a few assessments myself with respect to its
situation in some of the Eastern European countries, is much less suffering from
being infected by expansive western science than it is actually dying from the
financial disaster and from the badly equipped universities and academies.
Evidently, the peak of the post-socialist crisis for these institutions has not
been reached yet. While I do not particularly like the control methods of some
of the western social science colleagues towards their Eastern European fellow
researchers, I do believe that they cause much less damage than the incorrect
university policy caused by the domestic politicians and by those from the West
supporting this policy conceptually and financially.
The vivid and controversial reaction to the Hungarian authors' contribution
confirms the current relevance and volatile nature of the issue discussed. Due
to the limited setting of a commentary and the complexity of the questions, I
can only address a few selected problems by developing some theses. Accepting
this friendly invitation to write a commentary, I will focus on the specific
nature of the GDR/East Germany.
Before I start, let me make two statements with respect to the previously
published comments.
Firstly, I cannot detect in the Hungarian authors' contributions a serious
questioning of an equal East-West research cooperation, neither as far as their
agenda is concerned nor how they developed the idea. On the contrary, they
criticize the current practice, because they are looking for ways to establish
an equally entitled East-West-work relationship in the social sciences.
Secondly, the goal of a scientific discourse, and this is what, I believe,
all participants have in mind, is not the Eastern Europeans' appropriate and
missing acknowledgement of and gratitude towards Western support, but the issue
is rather to pursue the scientifically appropriate problems and their solutions.
These cannot merely be "friendly" or "grateful". There is
maybe a place for that at another point. With this in mind, the term
"colonization" should be perceived neither as journalistic polemics
nor as a political battle term, but should rather serve social science
definitions and discourses.
I. In the previous contributions the term "colonization" plays an
important part. Unfortunately, thus far, neither a definition nor as much as an
operationalization of the term has been offered. Quite a few controversies and
differences of opinion stem from the different understanding and the various
associated concrete historical examples. In its most general form, I would
operationally describe the term as follows: Colonization is a policy which
enforces societal dominance and societal transformation from "outside"
(in territorial regions, individual states or groups of states or
sub-societies). The means employed may include military, economic (in the widest
sense), legal-institutional, spiritual-cultural and personal means. "From
outside" may imply either military conquest, ("classical
colonies") or economic dependency between two states ("neo-colonism")
or society's political dominance over a specific region within a state
("inner colonization"). The historical multitude and the different
levels are obvious. The essential factor is the loss of self-dependent subjects
and the self-organization of traditional society to a new societal constitution.
Colonization combines complete or partial, direct or indirect power from outside
with the societal and political development concepts by the governing subjects
from outside.
II. After the East German 1990 parliamentary elections and the decision made
by the new freely elected parliament on the "GDR's unification with the
Federal Republic according to paragraph 6 of the Federal Republic's Basic
Law", an inner colonization process started, which
1. rendered the societal upholders of the 1989 radical turn of events in the
GDR insignificant as collective subjects (citizens' movements, round tables,
grassroots democratic elections of superiors, and others)
2. generally de-legitimized the overall GDR's 40-year societal development
including all its subsystems and even its citizen's biographies, and instead,
3. performed a complete West German institutional transfer,
4. implemented an economic "sale" to western multinational groups
and other capital investors resulting in a de-industrialization and the
elimination of the East's own industrial research
5. largely excluded the GDR's political, scientific, economic and cultural
elites and, on a very short-term basis, achieved a transfer of dominating elites
and civil servants from West to East Germany.
6. institutionally excluded the official "Marxism-Leninism" and
with it, all Marxist and Socialist thought as a continuing cultural tradition as
well as
7. rated the East Germans' previous life achievements and even the future
real life chances as secondary.
8. Nine years after the German-German unification, a societal and political
mechanism has manifested itself, through which the political, economic,
spiritual-cultural and personal dominance in East Germany is clearly emanating
from institutions and officials dominated by West Germans.
There are unsuspicious voices explaining this: Wolfgang Schaeuble as West
German chief negotiator expressed to GDR-representative Krause: "Folks,
this is a the GDR entering the Federal Republic. You are very welcome. We do not
wish to callously ignore your wishes and interests, however, this is not a
unification of two equal states." (W. Schaeuble; Der Vertrag. Stuttgart
1991, p. 131).
And Hans-Juergen Derlien, one of the leading researchers on elites at Bamberg
University illustrated the results in The Parliament's weekly insert: "The
higher the position in administration and the justice system, the higher is the
proportion of West Germans ... the larger the industrial enterprise, the more it
is likely to be under West German capital and personnel management. On the other
hand, the more one begins to climb down the ladder in organizations, ministries,
courts, radio stations, banks and private enterprises, the more one will
encounter East Germans ... "(From 'Politik und Zeitgeschichte', 1998, No.
5, p. 15).
The authors Rolf Hochhuth and Guenter Grass have processed these facts in
"Wessis in Weimar" (West Germans in Weimar) and "Ein weites Feld"
(A wide field) by writing fiction.
III. As far as the social sciences in the former GDR and in today's East
Germany are concerned, the following theses can be presented based on the
previous discourse.
1. The GDR-institutions were handled in either a varied fashion or step by
step or were largely staffed with new staff members or predominantly professors
from West Germany. Besides the social science party institutes and the
Marxist-Leninist sections at universities and colleges, the institutes at the
Academy of Sciences and Academy of Educational Sciences, the "Central
Institute for Youth Research", and others, were all closed. The majority of
staff members went into early retirement, accepted temporary solutions, ended up
as unemployed or in non-scientific jobs. At universities and colleges almost all
professorial chairs in sociology were filled with West German experts!
2. Curriculum contents were mandated through West German curricula.
3. The practical societal GDR-experiences and the GDR's social science
findings merely served as a retrospective critical and self-critical analysis
and were temporarily used for a certain "know how" of concrete
conditions for current investigations, but not as research traditions worth
maintaining or continuing. In fact, their most well-meant reception was that the
Social Science Information Centre's Berlin office kept them for their archives.
4. A financially well equipped research program by the officially
institutionalized "Commission of the Social and Political Change" (KSPW/
1991-1996) stretching over several years allowed in over 60 printed volumes and
even more single studies a very detailed social science documentation of East
Germany's societal changes, without, in the Weberian sense, looking at the
problem from a scientific distance. Instead, for hundreds of GDR-scientists
after having lost their jobs this was a welcome temporary occupation to work on
the conceptual guidelines made up by a board of supervisors largely consisting
of West Germans, and to put together a massive collection of data. The editors
of the summarizing six final volumes on East German social and political changes
were 35 social scientists, 32 of whom were from the old republic.
5. The list of empirical examples of such kind is endless, yet there is one
particular basic question addressed by the Hungarian authors deserving to be
discussed: to what extent are East Germans in fact accepted as scientific
representatives of the overall discipline or at best as empirical experts for
the GDR, for Eastern Germany or maybe Eastern Europe!? Here again, the empirical
findings are obvious, documented in book publications, publishing and editorial
boards, main lectures at congresses, representation in scientific boards (for
instance, in the German Society for Sociology). Peer Pasternack's analysis on
"Journals in the Humanities and Social Sciences in post 1989 East
Germany" offers a valuable insight into this problem as well. ("FORUM
Wissenschaft", 1998, No. 3, p. 59 - 64).
IV. Were there or are there alternatives to this kind of colonization? The
answer to this question must be broken down:
1. Since the state socialism in Eastern Europe had collapsed, and there
wasn't really any other alternative societal model than the "Capitalist
model" at hand, the transformation process, which took this direction under
the influence of the real Capitalist powers, from outside and without
alternative, was inevitably and in the previously mentioned sense a
"colonialist" process. This is not a polemic but rather a realistic
analytical characterization. In fact, more astonishing is that social science
analyses of the Eastern European transformation process bashfully disclaims this
colonization-approach methodologically and contents-wise and instead, tries to
explain everything entirely with modernization, while it could be possible to
develop a methodological-theoretical synthesis using modernization through
colonization as a heuristic access to gaining scientific knowledge.
2. Despite all the things that Eastern European transformation processes have
in common, the specific Capitalist colonization/modernization is unique in every
country with respect to the historical starting points, the achieved
developmental level, the intensity of the course as well as the concrete way of
functioning. However, typologically there are a few qualitative and quantitative
differences in the basic patterns:
* Special case GDR/East Germany
* Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic
* Bulgaria, Slovak Republic, Rumania, Albania, Yugoslavian and USSR successor
states (except Russia)
* Russia (with its specific features)
We are still waiting for a systematic-comparative analysis with respect to
common features and differences, despite the fact that there are several
empirical single studies. That is due to the KSPW-project's neglect on the part
of the German side (at least in the project's second or third stage).
3. In the special case of GDR/Eastern Germany, all decisions regarding the
integration into the Federal Republic were legally and politically justified by
the appropriation, by the deliberately chosen act of unification. But, in the
interest of future East Germany's and all of Germany's development, was this
kind of inevitable colonization process possible in yet another way? The Federal
Republic's Basic Law allows not only for a possible integration but also for a
new discussion about the constitution afterwards. Didn't the forty years of the
Federal Republic's development require a critical and self-critical analysis as
well? Didn't the discussions on the societal and political crises in the
Eighties challenge that? Instead, the Federal Republic's system, formed and
deformed as the other side of the Cold War, well-tried but used up and
established as a partial solution, got pushed through and accepted, with all the
deficits and crises of the West German science system in general and the social
sciences in particular. The discussion about the various crises in the West
German social sciences recurring over the decades were gone with the wind for
several years, because, one was able to have a share, even if undeservedly, in
the "historical success". Until recently, only the GDR-science has
been subject to key criticism with the highbrow question "Science and
Reunification" (Edited by J. Kocka and R. Mayntz, Berlin 1998), the
development of the old Republic's sciences with its deficits, ideologies and
functions of legitimatization, however, is not even remotely brought up as a
problem.
For the attentive observer of the research scenarios in the field of
"empirical social structure analyses" the 1989/90 political, social
and economic transformations in Eastern Europe represent only partially a
radical break with the scientific continuity.
For somebody, for instance, who since at least 1986 (depending on the
availability of financial means for travel expenses) has participated in the
conventions of ISA's "Research Committees on Social Stratification"
(RC28), the leading representatives of empirical social research from that time
coming from Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary are fairly well-known
colleagues. Since 1991, also younger, in social research well equipped
"students" of the old familiar colleagues from Russia are increasingly
making an appearance at conventions and congresses. The participation at the
congresses organized by the "European Sociological Association" since
Vienna, in September 1992, made sure that the discussion was continued.
The criticism of the continuity of Eastern European cadre elites after 1990,
frequently articulated with Western European arrogance, distorts the view with
respect to the two-sidedness of the transformation process. On the one hand, an
exchange of the political elites is necessary, on the other hand, one cannot or
doesn't want to assume that the entire intelligentsia which had a major impact
on exactly this radical turn should be exchanged.
The "re-surveying" of Eastern Europe is particularly difficult for
West German social scientists, whose image of Socialist sociology is only molded
by the illustrative material "GDR-society".
There are women and men in Eastern Europe of the so-called "first
hour" in their country, who were largely involved in the project that I
want to describe here as "Bringing Eastern Europe back to Europe".
This project made possible the exchange of comparative analyses, even large sets
of data, initially from Hungary and Poland (1986), which was acknowledged in
English-language publications. In the meantime, West German sociology had become
too self-referential to even acknowledge comparative social research.
What this has to do with the subject of East-West research cooperation? For
now only the contention awaiting contradiction that such large-scale comparative
research, from a West German point of view, has never taken place, with the
exception of a few bilateral contacts and the creditable efforts by some
infrastructural institutions under the roof of GESIS.
And this won't change much after the East/West German self-mirroring that
started after 1989. By now, British (Geoffrey Evans) and American social
scientists have gotten much more ahead with establishing a "normal
scientific community" with the participation of Eastern Europeans. One has
to concede, however, that particularly the USA (for some time even Australia )
did benefit from the temporary partial emigration of Eastern European social
scientists. Not least because in the USA, but also in the UK, funding was
provided for the particular field of comparative research while in Germany funds
went to the "Commission for the social and political change in the new
Federal States".
In Europe the following institutions and research groups were and are
performing large-scale primary investigations:
UK: Geoffrey Evans, Oxford.
Austria: The Institute for the Science of Man" in Vienna (Zsuzsa Ferge
et al.), Data set: "Social Costs of Transition" (SoCo); Paul
Lazarsfeld-Society (Christian Haerpfer; Richard Rose) "New Democracies
Barometer".
Germany: none
In the USA: predominantly and exemplarily: Don Treiman, Ivan Szelenyi
(Applicant for a large-scale project with completed data capture (1993) in
cooperation with renowned Eastern European social researchers) "Social
Stratification in Eastern Europe after 1989".
A central institution which provides Eastern European sets of data such as
micro-census, job counts and household surveys (similar to the socio-economic
panel) for secondary analyses, is the Luxembourg CEPS/INSTEAD data base
(Luxembourg Income Study, L. Employment S., Household Panel Comparability
Project).
In the end, with reference to the replika -contributions, I can only
report from the area I myself can overlook: the comparative data capture and
analysis, and due to the lack of detailed knowledge I would like to exclude the
EURO-Barometer opinion polls.
The following applies to the primary investigations mentioned above:
* They are largely made possible by Western European research funding or EU-funds,
respectively.
* They all took place in close cooperation with Eastern European social
scientists. Unlike Csepeli et al., they did not complain about the fact that, at
least temporarily their material existence was dependent on Western research
funds rather than being dependent on the distribution of means through Socialist
state bureaucracy. Andorka (in the same volume) did make a positive remark about
that.
* They all complied with the national request for the continuation of
comparative research, such as the participation in the ISSP. It is remarkable
that states in which the social sciences were much less affected by state
bureaucratic patronage, were the first to join the ISSP: Poland and Hungary. In
this connection a few projects should also be mentioned with which national
sociological research institutions distinguish themselves: They partially orient
themselves according to American and German projects such as ALLBUS. (Example:
Polish General Social Surveys; B. Cichomski, Z. Sawinski).
* For many projects and the maintenance of social science and infrastructural
institutions the following applies: We do have George Soros. I do not want to go
any deeper into this very special form of private promotion.
Data capture and acquisition of opinion polls are, indeed, happening
according to the "normal scientific community's general rules, and anybody
has access to the data. Which also means that Csepeli's and Oerkeny's accusation
of "colonization" is not really true for this phase of the research
process.
Another question is, under which conditions the sets of data are being
analyzed in cooperation with Eastern European social scientists. At that point
one has to differentiate according to country, and general judgements about
Western colonization do contribute very little to the improvement of the
insufficient cooperation in some areas. I would like to take the chance and
present a particular thesis, although I am aware that I don't quite have a
complete overview on all comparative studies.
Significant thesis for further cooperation:
There is a particular school of thought within the ISA, internationally
accepted and also of merit, in that one can say: This also has to be done in
order to lay out the scope of medium-range theories. I would like to describe
them as "another country, yet another case". This is to say that, in
the course of an established paradigm within empirical research (" Value
change and post-materialism"; "social mobility"; " `Status'
and other scales", depending on the research design also: "electoral
behavior", "Different worlds of the welfare state") and due to
the accessibility of Eastern European data, all that really needs to be done is
to examine if in the course of transformation there are similar patterns of
social differentiation and distribution as there are in alleged modern or
Western societies (but Japan as well!). Some may have a preference for using the
term "sociology of variables".
Such research, by the way also supported by Eastern European social
scientists, doesn't really do justice to the cultural and contemporary
historical processes in the post-socialist countries. It would require a
comprehensive social structure research which would put the Eastern European
formations in relationship to Western Europe. Wherever participant observation
on the micro level does not suffice (and I myself prefer the documentation of
social behavior photographically) in order to portray the process character of
the development and formation of new internal social coherence on an overall
societal level and to comprehend in light of the changing context, the secondary
analysis of micro-data is a crucial aid.
Classifications of "social systems" should only be the final point
of a line of analysis, the basic components of which are to be located on the
micro-level: The study of individuals in light of changing institutions,
especially on the neglected intermediary level will have to abandon rash
modernization models for a while. It is neither possible to grasp the present
processes of change on the aggregate level by focusing only on economic data or
population distributions nor is an overly fast classification according to types
based on typical Western configurations of variables of much help.
By recalling Toqueville and letting the book by Robert D. Putnam (Making
Democracies Work. Civic Tradition in Modern Italy. - 1993) on Italy be a more
current example, the strengths of Eastern European sociologists working "on
location" as well as the necessity of cooperation is emphasized. Only in
light of accurate analyses of the transformation steps and their dependence on
paths and of the different "clocks" ("the simultaneousness of the
non-simultaneous") of the individual processes can the social scientists'
continuous deception through the real development at least be contained.
Cooperation is possible if research money is available, according to the
principle:
"We all want to know, how the system really works!" What are the
population's orientations and their options for acting in light of the changing
contexts?
In the introductory part of the Hungarian scientists' contribution
"Colonization or Partnership? Eastern Europe and Western social
sciences", one can read that it is difficult to speculate, how wide-spread
the Hungarian scientists' opinions are in Eastern Europe. (ibid. p. 24) From my
own experiences with a network of social scientists from many Eastern and
Central European countries over several years, I would like to specify this
cautious statement: The discussion doesn't refer to a particular Hungarian
problem or to views shared only by Hungarian scientists. After the opening of
the so-called Iron Curtain, most countries of Eastern and Central Europe made
new experiences in the contact with scientific communities from Western
countries. Certain experiences, however, especially with respect to aid and
support for science offered by the West in various forms, were hardly publicly
discussed in these countries, not even among scientists, since being dependent
on Western funds is still vital for the survival of research. Although the
Hungarian contributions are laden with emotions distorting the actual facts, it
is entirely due to these authors that this debate is being discussed in public
now. It is time that both parties, the East and the West, engage in an objective
and critical stocktaking of what has been done under the pretense of "aid
and support for the sciences" and what actually has been accomplished. The
statements by the Hungarian scientists are very much to the point: Sooner or
later one will notice that "the definition of help was not the same for
Western and Eastern scholars." (ibid., p. 24)
In my opinion, both sides are to clarify and analyze which specific ideas and
expectations were underlying, when aid was given and received, and they ought to
critically review these results from the point of the view of both the helper
and the recipient. Honestly questioning oneself and an open confrontation of
both views would probably reveal a few factors eliminating disagreements,
inefficiency, bad investments, a one-sided apportioning of blame for failure and
much more, so that finally the goal of a scientific cooperation between equal
partners could be reached, even if it is still far away.
The problem with cooperation that I experienced and that was also addressed
in the Hungarian discussion, appears to have been underestimated by Western
scientists in dealing with their colleagues from Eastern and Central Europe,
namely the problems of cultural translation. True support and cooperation
require knowledge going far beyond the scientific subject and actual language
skills, meaning the language necessary to communicate about the subject.
Research developments and results in the Eastern European countries have to be
seen in the context of their societies. Generally referring to former state
socialist conditions may explain phenomena and events in the sciences as well as
opinions and ideas among scientists only insufficiently. Be it that Western and
Eastern scientists have a different role in society, or that the history of
certain discussions distorts current debates and thereby makes them hard to
understand, be it that present working conditions for Eastern European
scientists are automatically equated with those of their Western colleagues,
just because former political and ideological constraints have been eradicated
and there is now a market economy. ... it is in fact difficult for a Westerner
to understand intellectual life in the East" (ibid., p. 29). I don't
consider this to be an insurmountable obstacle for Western researchers, but much
rather a need to catch up and a challenge playing an important part in the
cooperation between East and West, which should not be underestimated. The vital
interest in the past and the presence of "intellectual life" that I
encountered all over again in conversations with scientists, shows that with an
increasing mutual acknowledgement of traditions, conditions and scientific
achievements, there will be a growing understanding among Western researchers
that the promotion of science in Eastern and Central Europe has to go hand in
hand with respecting the countries' self-determinations and should mostly result
in the help for self-help. Most welcome would be if all those affected
participated in the dialog initiated in Hungary. Because the countries receiving
Western funds are still divided into two camps: one claims that these funds
undermine their national science potential (including all the negative
consequences), the other concedes that this is the only way to achieve the
necessary upswing in the sciences so crucial for society. Either one of these
opinions may be justified in this or that case, in a country, or discipline, or
institute, etc. And yet, it would be wrong now for both helpers and recipients
to retreat due to the negative experiences.
(Humboldt-University Berlin, Institute for Social Sciences)
Western overdetermination in the Central and Eastern European social
sciences "agenda-setting" in the play of "exogenous" and
"endogenous" factors: A commentary agreeing (to a large extent) with
the essay in dispute by G. Csepeli, A. Oerkeny and K.L. Scheppele
Aside from some polemic statements and exaggerations and the analogies with
which the authors somewhat got off the track (especially the epidemiological
ones), admittedly choosing "deliberately provocative terms" (Csepeli
et al. 1996b: 49), the essay represents for me an unusually strong analysis of
the extremely difficult present situation of the Eastern-Central European social
sciences a little less than a decade after the collapse of the Communist regime,
and of the situation's defining exogenous and endogenous factors. Irrespective
of their emotional involvement and their personal anger, which is obviously
guiding them in their thoughts, the authors speak in their contribution
"more about structures than about individuals" (Csepeli et al. 1996b:
63) and are able to elaborate on the defining structural factors in both a
concise and condensed fashion on a few pages. Due to my own observations and
experiences, even if they consist only of parts and episodes, gathered in
conjunction with my work in and on the transformation in Eastern Central Europe,
I largely agree with the analysis and its structural core message. Yet,
I like to stress a few different points in order to come up with an overall
more optimistic assessment, especially in the long and medium term. With this in
mind, I would like to present a few comments:
1. Social science transformation in post-socialist countries in the tight
spot between the defining "exogenous" and "endogenous"
factors [60].
The development of the social sciences and their issue-related, cognitive and
methodical profile ("agenda setting") in the post-socialist countries
was in its beginning stage after the collapse of the Communist regime impacted
by a - as the authors are emphasizing many times - fundamental
"asymmetry". In this asymmetry the social sciences of a collapsing
post-socialist world met with a Western science system that was institutionally
and discipline-wise consolidated, personnel-wise and financially well equipped,
and cognitively and methodologically "modern". In this fundamental
"asymmetry" the latter was meant to be the superior defining exogenous
factor from the very beginning, even to the point of overdetermination or, as
the authors pointedly put it, to "colonization".
Let me make this asymmetry clear in note form (at the risk of repeating what
has already been stated many times elsewhere; the authors did it themselves)
To start with the endogenous conditions and among those the institutional and
cognitive-mental legacies of the Communist regime which burden the further
development :
In the Eastern and Central European countries the Communist regime had pretty
much destroyed and spoiled all foundations to the core, which, as one knows from
comparative research in the sociology and history of science (compare Wittrock/Wagner/Wollmann
1991), are inevitable for the emergence and continuation of an autonomous social
science world and community and its independent agenda setting. Concerning this,
a few crucial points should be made. I have to keep it short, because I cannot
possibly make allowances for the fact that there were considerable differences
manifesting themselves in the social sciences in the countries of the Eastern
bloc due to the development of varying levels of political repression and
patronage that marked the discourse and exchange with western social sciences
starting already in the Seventies and Eighties.
* The social sciences were, more than other sciences, due to the significance
they had for the Communist regime in terms of the production of ideological
legitimization and the ideological influence on the population, much more bound
by their obligation towards the party and the party and state leadership's
patronage. The social science research agenda was regulated from outside by the
party and state leadership's assignments and approvals. Thus, due to ideological
reasons and power politics, there was no space for an independent science.
* There were, in fact, first signs of sociological research in the late
Sixties, which then developed in the course of Perestroika more strongly in the
Eighties, and finally established itself at the Academy institutes. However,
sociology was largely geared towards providing (as a rule unpublished) knowledge
for the ruling party and state leadership. Methodically that was the beginning
of a survey research and social science guided by US-American examples
predominantly qualified in and having complete command of data inquiry and
analysis including the verbalization of it, yet keeping a low profile, when it
came to risky (politically risky anywise) "causal" explanations and
interpretations. While as a result sociology essentially functioned as survey
research in the real-socialist countries, the social sciences and with them
political science stuck to scientific Communism. The questions, approaches and
methods of empirical political and administrative research highly suspected of
functioning as espionage sciences, because both of them focused so much on the
inner life of politics and administration, were excluded up to the collapse of
the Communist system. Although after the turn, the representatives of scientific
Communism one by one changed into political scientists, the empirical political
science and administrative science was cognitively and qualitatively as good as
an unknown quantity.
* Due to the social science ideological sensitivity and regime relevancy,
students, new generation scientists and professors were as a rule only admitted,
when there was no doubt in terms of their loyalty to the regime. This also
applied to the "travel cadre" through whom the contact to the
Capitalist countries was established. After the turn of events in the Eastern
and Central European countries, a personnel exchange of the social science elite
took place, but to a lesser degree than in East Germany, so that most of the
presently employed social scientists were recruited and socialized under the
ancien regime.
While, as a heritage of the Communist regime and as "endogenous"
conditions, the institutional, personnel-related, cognitive and
qualification-related situation for an independent development of the social
sciences and a self-determined agenda hardly presented itself, there was also a
lack of "endogenous" factors in the most post-socialist countries
after the turn, which could have triggered this potential development.
Particularly in light of the socio-economic and financial predicaments of the
transformation process, the reform states were unable to promote the
construction of the sciences, especially the social sciences, in a substantial
way. The fact that in the reform states a scientific or social science policy is
largely missing, makes this deficit in politics very obvious.
While in the reform states the asymmetry and its endogenous conditions are
marked by the institutional and mental heritage of the Communist regime as well
as by the science-related deficit in politics and finances during the
post-turn-period, it evolves on the Western part in form of powerful, exogenous
factors embodied in the western social science system. The social sciences had
been influenced by a historical development going back to the last century. This
development happened in the USA mostly in the 1920s and led to the fact that
social sciences in post 1945 Western Europe under the strong influence of the
US-social sciences went through several stages of institutionalization,
professionalization and modernization. As a result of this historical
development the western social sciences presented themselves to the collapsing,
conceptually and methodically still antiquated scientific world in the Socialist
countries as a scientifically and historically consolidated science system with
huge institutional, personnel and financial capacities and with a modern
theoretical and methodical foundation - parallel to the existing dominance of
the US-social sciences. The collapse of the Communist regime led to the western
social sciences' radical reorientation in terms of their research agenda: While
up to that point research focusing on communist countries was generally viewed
as rather marginal despite its occasional significance, the radical turn in the
Eastern and Central European countries became, you might say, overnight an
acknowledged research topic, full of reputation and financially quite potential,
not only among the area-specialists, but also temporarily among newcomers.
For the Eastern and Central European scientists it must have felt like an
invasion, how western researchers intruded their countries like locusts, at
least in the early phase of the Wild (research) East. Occasionally, they
displayed a mentality like that of a research entrepreneur or a gold digger and
that may have seemed alienating, even exploitative and offensive to the Eastern
and Central European colleagues. There was nothing they could or wanted to hold
against that.
In the far-reaching "asymmetric" starting situation, i.e. the
Communist regime's legacy plus the post-turn-period on the endogenous side, and
the institutional, personnel, financial and cognitive power of the western
science system on the exogenous side, one can see the actual reason for the
latter gaining such influential power with respect to the agenda-setting, the
effect of which Csepeli et al. described as "colonization".
To the extent that the domestic researchers due to the lack of their own
funding had to depend on the availability of western financing for their own
survival, the western financers as well as the scientists having certain
research questions and projects in mind (and in their suits cases for that
matter) gained power of control over the research topics. The more complete the
research funding was, the stronger the Eastern-Central European social research
and its agenda was filtered through western research interests. "Research
topics tend to travel where the money is" (Csepeli et al. 1996b.-
56) or in common parlance: "Who pays, is buying". In the other context
of discussion (namely about the possible applied social research agenda-setting
and its adaptation to how politics and administration views their problems and
needs) such a - conscious or unconscious - adaptation of the social science
reference frame has been described as "epistemic drift" (Elzinga
1985" Wittrock/Wagner/Wollmann 1991: 57 f. Such an "epistemic
drift" Csepeli et al. have in mind when assessing that social research in
various Eastern and Central European countries has lost the chance to form its
own research agenda, through which they could carry on where the pre-communist
research traditions left off, or see their social reality with their own eyes
rather than through western glasses. In an exaggerated fashion, however, Csepeli
et al. (1996a: 31) see a "new cognitive iron curtain" between East and
West" coming down. As a result of the western social science model and its
dominating and controlling power, the development of the Eastern and Central
European social sciences and their research agenda is still, now as ever,
controlled to a great extent by "reception" and "imitation"
- much less by "innovation", to lend the terminology from
transformation research on Eastern Germany (compare. Wollmann 1997)
In an institutional and research cultural respect, the development of the
social sciences in the post 1990 Eastern-Central European countries was
characterized by the fact there were never an attempts made in scientific or
institutional policy to eliminate the institutional and mental barriers
inherited from the Communist era. On the contrary, one can observe new
mechanisms in the science business, through which the social science community's
education is prolonged or impeded in the various countries. The prestige of the
western social science system and the charm, in fact, the vital necessity of
western science promotion contribute significantly to the phenomenon that many
Eastern and Central European social scientists predominantly see themselves
involved in western contacts and networks, while scientific contacts among
fellow researchers in their own country, let alone the contacts among the
Eastern-Central European states, are neglected. (compare: Csepeli et al. 1996a:
25). The competition over the scarce resources as well as the jealous perception
or the secrecy with respect to their own contacts with western colleagues or
funding institutions create more individualization and a loss of solidarity
within the respective national scientific contexts, poisoning the education and
consolidation of a national "social science community". Whoever had
the opportunity to participate in conferences and working groups organized by
the Academy's Institutes for State and Law and the scientists working there
during the years of Perestroika, was able to observe the activities of
"scientific (sub-) communities" or at least groups of social science
fellow researchers, the members of which were -across states - remarkably
critical and almost bound like "sworn communities". Even these
"niche-like" networks that had developed under the ancien regime and
the friendly connections among scientists within and between the Eastern bloc
states have been largely destroyed by the system's collapse. One can fully agree
with Csepeli et al., when they write: "The disintegrated state of the
Eastern European scholarly communities is probably the most important source of
weakness and defenselessness against Western intrusion" (1996a: 26).
Even more: As it is known from the comparative sociology and history of science,
the emergence and consolidation of scientific disciplines and communities
manifested in the functions of scientific associations and journals represent
necessary but non-sufficient conditions for a self-determination of the research
agenda within the sciences. As long as this disintegrated status in the social
science world has not yet been defeated, a significant institutional and
research-cultural requirement for any self-determination is left behind.
2. Analytical weakness in Csepeli's essay: The neglect of time dimension
and its phase dynamics
In their polemic and picturesque language, Csepeli et al. describe the
development of the Eastern and Central European social sciences as a
"colonization trap" (1996b: 30). Zuzana Kusa with the Slovak
Republic's development and situation in mind, agrees in her commentary almost
entirely with this analysis and assessment, even if she, using sinister language
herself, calls the article a coroner's report (Krusa 1996:37). I, however, see a
remarkable analytical weakness in both Csepeli's contribution and Kusa's
commentary and in her quite fatalist assessment. Both neglect the time dimension
and its specific dynamic. As transformation research has taught us by now, the
transformation process happened in quick motion, and cut into single stages, it
displays various different periods with different defining factors and rates of
change and dynamics. Once the possible dynamics of change is ignored over time,
any analysis or interpretation runs the risk of becoming ahistorical and static
on the side and will fade out the significance and dynamics of the learning
process. Such processes of change and learning can be observed on the western
side. For one, the times of the locust swarms are over. Many western social
scientists, fascinated by the century's main event of the collapse of the
Communist regime, who initially had abandoned their past research agendas
throwing themselves into transformation research, have now returned to their old
research routines. Both the interest in the Eastern and Central European
countries as well as the western researchers' presence there has significantly
dropped, more than was wanted by the Eastern colleagues. For another, the phase
of the Wild (research) East is over, when some western researchers had the
courage to employ their Eastern colleagues as underpaid assistants for data
collection jobs. (It is these scientists specifically that Csepeli et al.
understandably are focusing on in their tirade. [61])
By now multiple forms of cooperation and co-authorships etc. have established
themselves controlling everyday life of the East-West research business (this is
also emphasized by Andorka 1996 and Lemon/Altshuler 1996).
Even on the part of the Eastern-Central European social scientists noticeable
changes and learning processes have taken place. While the Eastern researchers
initially more or less blindly trusted the Western scientists during the
euphoria accompanying the system change, and while they initially were able to
miss out on the encounters with the western science system and its
representatives driven only by the individual gain in reputation, they have
learned to manage by now, in protecting their own interests. To the extent that
the domestic researchers' professional competence and self-assurance are growing
stronger, their chances of becoming equal partners in the East-West cooperation
and being able to control their own cognitive agenda are increasing.
3. Getting out of the "colonization trap"?
One can definitely agree with Csepeli et al., who seem to think that a
promising solution to this situation characterized by the colonization trap lies
mainly in the possibility of a new discourse stimulated by Eastern Central
European social scientists both in their own country and across the Eastern and
Central states.
This would serve the subject-related, conceptual and disciplinary understanding
and self-assurance in the national and international context. The leading issue
for them is "the much-needed merger between the legacy of historical and
cultural uniqueness of the Eastern European social reality and the post-modern
armory of advanced European scholarship" (Csepeli et al. 1996a: 30).
A path from "imitation" to "one's independent development"
if not innovation could be seen to emerge. Csepeli et al. rightfully appeal to
the Eastern colleague' initiative and willingness to become active themselves in
order to clear the path for the cognitive requirements necessary for the
emergence and consolidation of an independent social science, to counteract the
western overly controlled "epistemic drift" and to lay the foundations
for an independent discourse.
At the same time, the Eastern colleagues should challenge themselves (more
than was suggested in Csepeli's article) to become politically and socially
active and demand from their countries' politicians the long due social science
programs. (A large number of scientists that had at least temporarily switched
to top positions in politics and administration, should be able to provide for
such an improved lobbying.) The goal should be to create the institutional
conditions, because, as we all know from the comparative science of science,
those build the necessary foundation to allow the social sciences to develop
their independent disciplines with research agendas controlled from inside.
* The clarification and the clearing of the relationships research maintains
within and outside of the universities is one necessary step. Even now the
division or division of labor created during the Communist era is still
dominating the research landscape. According to this division the Academies were
in charge of research and the universities in charge of teaching (compare
Csepeli et al. 1996a: 30). With this, old institutional and personnel conflicts
are continued without solving them.
* What counts here is the insight that the promotion of one's own research
through an independent "peer review"-controlled research funding is an
inevitable foundation for the development of a social research completely
autonomous with respect to the choice of its agenda in the respective country.
References:
1) For the distinctions between "exogenous", i.e. defining factors
lying outside of the transformation country, versus "endogenous", i.e.
factors lying within that particular country, made at various points in the
transformation research, compare Wollmann 1996: 51.
2) "... criticism applied primarily to the many Westerners jetting in
and out of the Region on data safaris, looking to spot and capture local data
with the assistance of local guides" (Csepeli et al. 1996b: 3).
Literature
Andorka, Rudolf 1996, The Uses of International Cooperation in the Social
Sciences, in: replika, special issue 1996
Csepeli, György/ Örkeny, Antal/ Scheppele, Kim Lane 1996a, Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndromes in Social Science in Eastern Europe, in: replika, special
issue 1996
Csepeli, György/ Örkeny, Antal/ Scheppele, Kim Lane: 1996b, Response to our
Critics (and to our Supporters), in: replika, special issue 1996
Elzinga, Aant 1985, Research, Bureaucracy, and the Drift of Epistemic
Criteria, in: Wittrock, Björn/ Elzinga, Aant (eds.), The University
Research System, Stockholm, pp. 191
Kusa, Zuzana 1996, The Immune Deficiency - Acquired or Inherited, in:
replika, special issue 1996
Lemon, Alaina/ Altshuler, David 1996, Whose Social Science is Colonized?, in:
replika, special issue 1996
Wittrock, Björn/ Wagner, Peter/ Wollmann Hellmut 1991, Social science and
the modern state: policy knowledge and political institutions in Western Europe
and the United States, in: Wagner, Peter et al. (eds.), Social Sciences and
modern States, Cambridge, pp. 28
Wollmann, Hellmut 1996, Institutionenbildung in Ostdeutschland: Neubau, Umbau
und "schöpferische Zerstörung", in: Kaase, Max et al. (eds.),
Politisches System, Opladen 1996, pp. 47 .
Wollmann, Hellmut 1997, Transformation der ostdeutschen Kommunalstrukturen:
Rezeption, Eigenentwicklung, Innovation, in: Wollmann, Hellmut et
al. (eds.), Transformation der politisch-administrativen Strukturen in
Ostdeutschland, Opladen, pp. 259.
[46] Sozialwissenschaften im neuen Eastern
Europe : Institutionen und Forschungsprojekte / Hrsg.v. Heinrich Best ; Ulrike
Becker. Bearb. v. Jana Meichsner... - Bonn ; Berlin : Informationszentrum
Sozialwiss., |
