Elasticity of Marginal Utility of Consumption in the European Region: The Absolute Equal-Sacrifice Approach

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• Estimation of the social welfare of policy measures such as energy transition, climate change mitigation or other environmental policies



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- Welfare estimation has remarkable implications for the allocation of funds to various social projects
- The efficiency of such social projects is usually evaluated through benefit-cost analysis (BCA)
- The key aspect of the estimation of social welfare lies in determining the social discount rate (SDR), which states the rate at which society is willing to accept the inter-temporal trade-offs of consumption.

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- Does the magnitude of its estimate vary over time?
- Is our estimate in line with the estimates coming from elsewhere?
- What is the implication of our research on the value of the social discount rate?

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Determining the social discount rate (SDR)

• (Ramsey, 1928) suggested using the following formula known as the Ramsey rule:

$$r = \rho + \mu g(C)$$

r is the social discount rate
ρ is the rate of pure time preference
g(C) is the real growth rate of per capita consumption
μ is the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption

Determining the social discount rate (SDR)

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• Typically, the value of ρ equals 3%, 1%, 0%, or a near-zero rate of time preference as in the case of the 2006 Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change (Dasgupta, 2021; Tol, 2013).

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- μ attracts various economic interpretations: μ refers to intra-temporal inequality aversion, inter-temporal inequality aversion or risk aversion (Dasgupta, 2008; Drupp et al., 2018; Sælen et al., 2009)
- Most Integrated Impact Assessment (IAM) models, including DICE, PAGE, FUND, and WITCH have used the values of $\mu=1$ or $\mu=1.5$



Determining μ

• The parameter *μ* can be estimated relying on **indirect** behavioural evidence, social values revealed through acceptance of tax schedules, or survey data that contain information about felicity (Evans, 2005)

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- The parameter μ can be estimated relying on **indirect** behavioural evidence, social values revealed through acceptance of tax schedules, or survey data that contain information about felicity (Evans, 2005)
- This study focuses on a robust estimation of the parameter μ for the European region using income tax schedules, namely the absolute equal-sacrifice approach

The absolute equal-sacrifice approach

• The electorate has agreed on the tax structure such that each consumer should equally sacrifice (Groom & Maddison, 2019; Mill, 1848, Bk. V, Ch. II):

$$U(Y) - U(Y - T(Y)) = k$$

- k is constant
 T(Y) is the the total tax liability
 Y is the gross income
- Proportional and Marginal approaches



The absolute equal-sacrifice approach

• It requires the use of the iso-elastic utility function - constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) functions:

$$U(Y) = \frac{Y^{1-\mu} - 1}{1 - \mu}$$

μ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion (used as the elasticity
of marginal utility of consumption)
 Y is the gross income

The absolute equal-sacrifice approach

• Putting all assumptions together we get: computed

$$\mu = \frac{ln(1 - M\hat{T}R)}{ln(1 - \frac{T(Y)}{Y})}$$

or regressed

$$ln(1 - M\hat{T}R) = \mu ln(1 - \frac{T(Y)}{Y}) + \epsilon$$

• \widehat{MTR} is the Marginal Tax Rate (derived by OLS estimation $T(Y)_{t,j,h} = MTR_{t,j} * Y_{t,j,h} + e_{t,j,h}$ from the individual data) $\frac{T(Y)}{Y}$ is the Average Tax Rate for whole sample (or groups)

Data

- EU SILC datasets covering information about households between 2004 and 2020 from 30 countries
- Information about Income, Paid Income Tax (PIT), Social and Health Insurance (paid by employee and employer), Social Benefits

Data

• Approaches:

Computed Regressed with 95% CI

• Variable definition:

TAX = PIT + Social and Health Insurance Income = all income **included** Social Benefits


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Results, Computed, by year

Figure: Estimate of the parameter μ




Note: Own computation using SILC datasets, pooled data 2004 until 2020, 95% CI

Results by Country (regressed)



Slovenia indicates $\mu_{SI}=1.77$, Luxembourg $\mu_{LU}=1.61$, Malta $\mu_{MT}=1.59$, Cyprus $\mu_{CY}=1.57$, Iceland $\mu_{CY}=1.40$ and Greece $\mu_{EL}=1.37$.

Figure: Central estimate $\mu = 1.42$



Note: $\mu = 1.42$ is our central estimate for covered countries (regression method)



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- Our study does not support the standard use of $\mu = 1$



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- At the moment we have elicited μ by using the national surveys in Czech, UK, Austria and Spain
- Put into contrast intra-temporal, inter-temporal and risk aversion aspects of μ

Questions

