Editorial

Dear readers,

In the years before the GESIS Service Agency Eastern Europe published special editions of the Newsletter “Social Science in Eastern Europe” with a regional or subject focus. We will continue this tradition in the framework of a thematic series “Social Sciences Eastern Europe”, which will be distributed electronically twice a year free of charge.

This time we have placed the main emphasis on research and teaching pertaining to the issue of national identity in Eastern Europe and intend to give an insight into and access to the facts and background information to scholars, students and professionals as well as to science policy makers and funding organizations.

The edition has the following focal points: the first part encompasses papers covering specificities of national identity in Eastern Europe. The second part offers comprehensive information (including contact information and links to homepages) on universities, research institutions, academic networks and scholarly journals focusing on identity research. References to the information supply infrastructure (virtual libraries, bibliographic databases) as well as relevant Internet sites are also included.

This edition does not and cannot lay claim to completeness of coverage. Nevertheless, it gives insight into research structure and activities related to the issue of national identity.

We hope that this special edition will be of interest to the scientific community and improve options for cooperation and communication between scholars, universities and research organizations in Eastern and Western Europe.

Editorial team
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The Specificity of the National Identity in the Epoch of Globalization

In strongest terms it is possible to say that specific historical circumstances are an important reason of cultural and social differences and because of them the differences do not disappear as it was expected when globalization started. Nowadays, at the beginning of the XXI century, such differences are considered as a subject of special investigation. In addition, the term “identity” is used more and more often and becomes more popular.

The concept of identity (from Latin *identicus* – the same, equal) has become so flexible and mobile, that it can at best be used just as a certain marker in relation to any social phenomenon. The usage of the word “identity” is so popular now that with its help it is possible to analyze the sphere of education, culture, different social, religious, national contradictions, etc. In addition, the identity as a phenomenon first of all reflects a certain reality, the being of our self-consciousness but, at the same time, with the help of it we single out ourselves from the world of everydayness.

As we take the national identity as an example, it is possible to argue about the identity of the modern Poles, Lithuanians, Germans, Belarusians, etc. However, we fix it with the help of our language at the moment of explicating and underlining differences. When we outline: “I am a Belarusian”, it means I am not a German, a Pole, a Lithuanian, etc. In some sense the identity has been stipulated by a real border of this or that space. But this space is no more only physical in the epoch of globalization. The identity is impossible without borders, because a border, as it was noted by Martin Heidegger, is not the place where something ends, but it is the place where something starts to exist. Therefore the identification means rather distinguishing than association. Because of that it is specific and interesting. Besides, we can notice it on all levels. It is possible to speak about the family and the national identity. It is possible to study European identity or the identity of Latin American residents, investigate Christian or Muslim identity. Nevertheless, it is hardly pertinent here to use any logical criteria with the help of which we could offer one general way of analysis.

The search for identity is inherently connected with the fight for recognition, and it often leads to the claim for one’s own oneness, and even to the demonstration of cultural and other types of extremism, and finally to the aggressiveness in the relation to the Other. As we see, the problem of identity is highly multi-polar in its displays and for its solving. There are plenty of variations of its analysis and understanding. The topic is particularly attractive when we try to analyze the process of the national state formation. Alternatively, it is suitable for any other social phenomenon in its historical development; for example, such as European integration, globalization, post-soviet decentralization which have caused new independent identities. The question is how historical memory on the one hand and postmodern context on the other can impact transformation of modern national identities.

Radical historical geopolitical and social changes in the XX century certify the birth of a person with a new outlook, fundamentally different from the previous. Moreover, it happens on the global level. The same situation happens in the modern Belarus as well. In other words, the change of generations is coming. We are all looking for the generation which will be not indifferent to the values of its own culture and nation. Such generation will be able to give a new impact to the renaissance of the national culture, which will get a new level of development and a new content. In this system of values we can try to provide a new understanding to such concepts as “space”, “place”, “own”, “strange”, “border”, “state”, and “nation”.

Among the cases of the transformation of identity, in a very general perspective, there are the development and wide expansion of informational technologies (it leads to the interosculation of cultures) as well as the compression of space and time that follows from the previous. The closeness and accessibility of any culture leads to the situation when a lot of different others are present in our semantic space. In addition, as a result it becomes difficult to distinguish one’s own and other’s. But we know that one’s own identity is impossible without the border between mine and other’s and correspondingly it is impossible without those who are different from me. In such situation when the identification with one specific nation, which you belong to by birth, becomes more and more problematic, we can define our world as multi-identical. However, at the same time we can observe...
intensive flashes of national egoism and a nation’s unceasing fight for independence and recognition. In Belarus this fight takes place on the level of political parties which have chosen the way of formation of the identity based on collective historical memory. Therefore, it is evident that it is not the time to refuse the identity as one of important personal characteristics. Moreover, we should analyze this identity and take into account all specific circumstances of the new world order, in order to answer the question how national identity is possible in the epoch of globalization.

Today the national identity could be expressed in the terms of aspiration to form specific state of people’s mind and people’s social and linguistic orientation. Moreover it includes the terms, related to the above said, of ideology, politics, as well as social theory and practices which treat nation as the basis for the existence of independent state and for the highest form of social unity. The strategy of the Belarusian state can be considered here as a way of building up its own self-sufficient national belonging through the specific relationship to other nations.

Modern Belarusian society can be characterized by the specific state of equality in the sense of belonging to the same political identity (it does not exclude social, economical and even cultural inequalities, of course). Standardized political culture is cultivated by the system of education, culture and distributed among the members of the society. This exposition of the specifics of the modern Belarusian identity can be considered as a symptom, which can help us with the diagnostics of the modern society. The identity is inseparably related to other descriptions of our time and with those changes, which are very evident displays of our epoch. Earlier we spoke rather about different aspects of the identity and about the phenomenon of the Belarusian identity in the context of globalization. Now we will turn to more specific problems and will try to present a point of view from inside.

The identity formation is closely related to the inevitable person’s aspiration to order. The topic of the relationship between the order and the identity is very hot in the modern rapidly changing world. The order is often defined as something that ensures more or less possibilities to foreknow the results of our actions and that guarantees the determined safety (Bauman 2002: 24). And normally we start to think about the order when it displays in a wrong form, or even disappears at all.

Nowadays in the situation of late modernity or post-modernity things are changing rapidly. Security and order are no more the main characteristics of our society. We can rather certify full disorder which is caused by unlimited and unprecedented freedom in human history. The lack of usual things order leads to confusion and anxiety. It is impossible to make somebody happy just by the substitution of the order by freedom. According to Zygmunt Bauman, freedom for a human society is integrated with dangers. It can generate as much misfortunes as safety without freedom (Bauman 2002: 78). “Individuals have been offered (or, rather, have been cast into) freedom of unprecedented proportions – but at the price of similarly unprecedented insecurity” (Bauman 2001: 159). Life in insecure conditions means life in risk conditions. And a person who makes decisions has to pay for this risk himself / herself. Normally a person needs at least minimal prediction of what will be tomorrow. It is impossible to live in suddenness. A person tries to supplement the lack of knowledge of what will be tomorrow and accordingly the lack of order by circumscribing himself from the source of unpredictability. As a rule, such method exactly is used in the process of identity construction. Such idea is also very popular among the followers of the Belarusian state politics of identity.

Let us turn now to the problem of the correlation between the state and nation from the point of view of identity. We know that globalization has arisen first of all as an economic phenomenon and this economic component has now influence to any other – cultural or social – processes. This economic impact is also one of the reasons of the crisis of traditional national identity and, accordingly, is the reason of the contradictions between cultures. There is an opinion (Zygmunt Bauman, Manuel Castells) that it is the process of globalization that impacts the new status of the national state and leads it to destruction. It is typical especially for a huge number of the new by arisen states, which are all fighting for recognition of their national identity and independence. However, national states are found now in the situation of the dependence on the global capital, which has no attachment to any state and is free in its movements. Global markets now dictate their own rules to the whole planet. The main aspect of this tendency is the loss of the control of internal affair within the state. If earlier a state meant a government body which applies on the basis of its legitimate right and possession of sufficient resources to have the right to establish and guarantee rules and norms on a certain territory, now it is getting more and more difficult to realize legal right of the state on the national safety and sovereignty (i.e. assert its own identity) (Bauman 2002: 112).

National states have to build up international relations now by joining different coalitions. It leads to the gradual loss of the state’s sovereignty. However, here we encounter the situation of a paradox. The more we lose our identity, the more power the state system gets, and that has influence on the national identity. Thus, the existence of the national identity is still the actuality, and then we encounter the dilemma of what is primary: the nation (as a certain ethno-cultural formation) in relation to the state or
the state in relation to the nation? Therefore, we can certify that the state can be centered without a
certain national idea, just be based on citizenship, for example. But the support of the national identity
often expresses state’s aspiration to strengthen its position and to increase its authority.

It is important to mention essential positive perspectives of globalization in relation to “peripheral”
cultures and nations. Such cultures and nations find perspective of social mobility. The process of
globalization leads this kind of culture to the idea that the border is an artificial formation and that the
border does not play an important role in the process of identification. It is more important that such
attitude loses the comprehension of own specificity, which, in spite of that is not an obstacle for any
communication. Such sources of communication as Internet in this context are technical components
and let this kind of integration come to an end.

Conclusions

The epoch of globalization – to our mind – is the epoch of the national renaissance. Social explosions
at the end of the XX century prove that nations live their own lives in the modern world, embodied in
cultural constructs and political projects.

National identity is one of a few remained sources of sense in the modern world. Just therefore,
national identity does not become a utopian project but, on the contrary, acquires essentially new
possibilities. In other words, a nation acquires a new possibility for self-realization.

As to the national identity, globalization leads to the “plurality of borders”, i.e. to the vanishing of the
opposition between nationality and internationality (Bek 2003). The previous leads to new politics of
differentiation: the western version of modernity should not dominate for us, during the evaluation of
other cultures. It is important to understand that non-western civilizations represent specific
combinations of culture, capital and national state.

References

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The Russian People and National Identity

Mechanisms for affirming national identity as a foundation of Russia’s statehood have long been the
source of much controversy among Russian policymakers and experts, while debates on this issue are
superficial and overly emotional. Juggling with such fundamental notions as ‘people’ and ‘nation’
involves serious risks for society and the state. In the Russian political vocabulary, the word
‘nationalism’ is attributed a negative meaning. Meanwhile, nationalism played a key role in the
formation of modern states and largely remains a major political ideology of the modern age. In Russia,
these debates have contributed to the development of three main characterizations of Russian society
and the state:

First, Russia is a multination state, which makes it totally different from other countries;

Second, Russia is a state of ethnic Russians (Russkij) with a host of other ethnic minorities whose
members can either identify themselves as Russians or acknowledge that the ethnic Russian majority
rightfully enjoys the state-building status;

Third, Russia (Rossiya) is a national state featuring a multi-ethnic “Rossiyan” nation (Rossiyane)
underpinned by the Russian language and culture, and embracing members of other ethnic
communities (usually defined as peoples, nationalities, ethnic groups or nations).

The Russian authorities, including the current and former presidents, Dmitry Medvedev and Vladimir
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4 This material was prepared for a discussion at the symposium “Foresight: Russia in the 21st Century,” organized by the
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a historical entity or civic nation. While it has its opponents, particularly among champions of ethnic nationalism who have proclaimed “a failure of the construction of a civic nation,” this interpretation of Russia’s current identity has been accepted and supported by a large number of intellectuals and policymakers as the only feasible option for Russia. Indeed, the formula is in line with the state (civic) national identity that has been adopted and proven successful in other major multi-ethnic countries around the world.

Global Context
Throughout the world, public policy discourses have come to embrace the perception of nations as territorial and political entities featuring complex – although integrated – social and cultural systems. No matter how ethnically or religiously heterogeneous some countries might be, they invariably define themselves as ‘nations’ and consider their states ‘national’ or ‘nation states.’ ‘People’ and ‘nation’ are synonyms here, and it is these two categories that impart primordial legitimacy to a modern state.

The perception of a united people/nation is a key factor in ensuring stability and accord in society, and is as strong a guarantee of the state’s strength as the Constitution, the Army and the guarded borders. The ideology of a ‘civic nation’ embraces the following attributes: the ethos of a responsible citizen; a unified education system; a commonly shared vision of the country’s past – both good and bad; a calendar and symbols; feelings of attachment to the country; loyalty to the state; and the upholding of national interests. All these factors form what is called ‘state (civic) nationalism.’

Civic nationalism exists in contrast to the ideology of ethnic nationalism, which embodies exclusively one or another ethnic community, often either a majority or minority of the given country’s population. That community considers only its immediate members, rather than all fellow countrymen, to be part of the nation, and, in instances of ethnic nationalism, seeks its own statehood or some form of preferential status. Clearly, there are important disparities between the two types of nationalism, especially given that ethnic nationalism stems from an ideology of exclusion and a rejection of diversity, while civic nationalism is based on an ideology of solidarity and readily integrated plurality.

Extreme nationalism among ethnic minorities presents a risk to the state – and to civic nationalism – particularly if they seek to secede from the country through the use of force. Admittedly, ethnic nationalism on behalf of a dominant group can likewise carry some serious risks. If such a community attempts to claim exclusive ownership of the state, it in turn risks engendering opponents of this state among the various subordinated ethnic communities.

For example, in India, Hindu nationalism on behalf of the Hindi-speaking majority sparked a string of domestic civil-war-like confrontations. Therefore, the Indian authorities now want to bolster the notion of an Indian nation that can encompass the country’s multitude of ethnic, religious and racial communities, both large and small. Since the times of Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, local elites and the state have been working to shore up civic Indian nationalism as a counterweight to Hindu nationalism or any other nationalism on behalf of ethnic or religious minorities. Thanks to a focused endeavor to sustain that ideology, India continues to enjoy its national integrity.

In China too, the dominant ethnic group (Han) and the concept of the Chinese nation (Minzu) largely correspond in terms of demography and core culture. Nonetheless, the Han have been unable to promote themselves as the dominant state-making ethnic nation due to the 55 other non-Han ethnic groups (or nationalities) that exist in China, which account for over 100 million people. Han chauvinism, criticized since the times of Mao Zedong, poses a threat to Chinese statehood for the very reason that it risks provoking discontent and separatism by non-Han communities, leading to the eventual disintegration of China. The concept of a civic Chinese nation made up of all the country’s citizens was developed a few decades ago, and it appears to be working well toward establishing and sustaining a unified Chinese national identity.

These two national identities, both civic and ethnic, similarly coexist in many other countries (Spain, the United Kingdom, Indonesia, Pakistan, Nigeria, Mexico, Canada, etc.), including Russia. Understandably, such nations feature a complex ethnic, religious and racial mix of communities, yet the dominant culture, language and religion nearly always provide the national cultural framework: English for the British nation, Castilian for the Spanish, Han for the Chinese, and Russian for the Rossiyan nation.

Therefore, while there are certain unique features of Russia’s nation-building ideology and its practice of using the ‘nation’ category, modern-day Russia is generally not exceptional in terms of its construction as a nation.

Nationalism in Pre-revolutionary Russia
A state is considered legitimate if its population views itself as a united nation loyal to its state. In Russia, this is the Russian (Rossiyan) people (Rossiyane). This notion emerged in the times of
Emperor Peter the Great and scientist and writer Mikhail Lomonosov and was further developed by outstanding public figures, starting from Nikolai Karamzin.

Russia developed a notion of Russian (Rossiyan) or “pan-Russian” (Pyotr Struve) nation at the same time (in the 18th and 19th centuries) as Europe and America formed the idea of modern nations based on civic nationalism. The words ‘Russkii’ and ‘Rossiyan’ were largely synonyms. The word ‘Russkii’ referred more to local customs and culture, while the word ‘Rossiyan’ referred to the whole nation.

For example, according to Karamzin, being a Rossiyan primarily amounted to having the capacity to feel a profound bond with the homeland (not the Tsar alone) and the desire to be a “perfect citizen.” This understanding of the notion of Rossiyan-ness was built on the basis of Russian culture and Orthodox Christianity (as well as on Catholic cultures in western Russia and Islamic ones in the Volga region). It imposed itself as the dominant school of thought, marginalizing the potential for ethnic nationalism not only in the country’s center, but also across its far-flung provinces (except for Poland and Finland).

Following on from this notion of a civic Rossiyan national identity, manifested in its various liberal-imperial and federalist forms, Struve quite rightly concluded that “Russia is a nation state” and that “while seeking to expand its core geographically, Russia has turned into a state featuring both national unity and multi-ethnic diversity.”

However, in Russia there were also supporters of an ethnographic Great Russian (Velikoruss) identity, according to whom the territory and the dominant culture of the empire was the sole preserve of the ethnic Russian majority. In fact, the long-standing endeavor to re-conceptualize the empire as a nation state of the Rossiyan “multi-peopled nation” (as defined by Ivan Ilyin) had still not been fully completed by 1917. While this was understandable given the enormity of the task in such a geographically vast and ethnically diverse country, it was primarily the result of a narrow-minded and ideologically disoriented ruling autocracy and political elite. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to think that, since pre-revolutionary Russia was an empire, it therefore was not a nation state.

Pre-revolutionary Russia already invoked, in the minds of its many different countrymen, a clear understanding of national territory, national economy and national interests. Furthermore, there existed a relatively large and both ethnically and religiously diverse stratum of educated professionals and civil servants who perceived themselves as members of the single Rossiyan people and regarded Russia as their homeland. It was not accidental that during the revolution and the Civil War opponents of Bolsheviks were united by the slogan of “defending a single and indivisible Russia.”

The perception of pre-revolutionary Russia as a “patchwork empire” and a “prison of peoples” was invented in Soviet times due to the revolutionary rejection of the past. Recent studies of nationalism suggest that pre-1917 Russia, far from being a historical anomaly, was in fact some form of emerging nation state, with its national core being built around the Russian language and culture.

**Reviewing the Soviet Era**

Under the Soviet regime, the nation-building project placed greater emphasis on recognizing the rights and separate identities of Russia’s ethnic groups. Ethno-territorial autonomies acquired “ethnic statehood” in the form of Union and autonomous republics. Finally, ethnic communities and regional/religious/tribal identities were engineered into “socialist nations.”

Starting in 1926, Soviet population censuses featured a mandatory nationality question that forced all citizens to identify with the ethnic background of one parent. The country’s population was thus broken down into “nations” and “nationalities” (ethnic groups), whose overall number depended on counting procedures and political-ideological guidelines. The content of the notion ‘Russkii’ changed and began to denote only former “Great Russians,” while the latter term disappeared first from public usage and then from people’s self-consciousness. People living in “Little Russia” (now known as Ukraine) began to call themselves Ukrainians; Belarusians remained Belarusians; but both groups ceased to consider themselves Russians at the same time.

Nonetheless, the Soviet model – while entrenching new ethnic and cultural divisions – also sought to provide a unifying ideology that would bind all the peoples of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics together. In this way, through narratives of internationalism and friendship among peoples, bolstered and enforced by iron-rule authoritarianism, the Soviet Union fostered an ideology of Soviet patriotism. In fact, while such a reality was never admitted or acknowledged by the leadership, the Soviet people actually constituted a civic nation, with the Soviet Union being a kind of nation state. While its specific ideological framework was unique, the Soviet Union was in many ways no different than other large and ethnically heterogeneous states that have been and are known as nation states, such as the United Kingdom, Spain, China, India, Indonesia, the U.S., Canada, Brazil, Mexico, and others.
The granting of statehood to ethnic territories was one of the factors in the Soviet Union’s breakup in the name of “national” – that is, ethnic – self-determination. After the breakup, the Soviet nation as a community was declared to be a chimera, and the Soviet Union was the “last empire.” However, despite the radical upheaval of the 1917 revolution and the watershed shift that took place, a series of studies have convincingly argued that the Soviet Union was an extension – in terms of its civic project – of the pre-revolutionary Russian state. At the same time, the word ‘Rossiya’ disappeared from the country’s name, as did the notions ‘Rossiyan people’ and ‘Rossiyans’ from the language.

The Soviet modernization and cultural policy, for all their distortions, helped small cultures to survive and develop, while common historical trials and accomplishments contributed to the consolidation of a civic nation in terms of entrenching similar social, cultural and behavioral patterns among the Soviet peoples.

A new Russian project

Due to the inertia of political and legal thinking, the Russian Constitution continues to feature the concept of multi-nationality, but this would be best substituted by the concept of a ‘multi-peopled nation.’ It is necessary to consistently affirm the notions ‘nation’ and ‘national’ in the official civic sense, without rejecting the established practice of using these notions in an ethno-cultural capacity. The coexistence of two different meanings for such a politically and emotionally loaded notion as ‘nation’ is possible within the framework of one country. At the same time, the primacy of the civic national identity is indisputable for its citizens, however hard ethnic nationalists may dispute this fact. The political leadership must explain that these two forms of identity are not mutually exclusive and that the notions ‘Rossiyan people,’ ‘Rossiyan nation’ and ‘Rossiyans’ do not deny the existence of ethnic Russian identity, Ossetian identity, Tatar identity, or that of any other people living in the country.

The overall effort to sustain and develop the languages and cultures of the peoples of Russia should proceed hand in hand with acknowledging the Rossiyan nation and Rossiyan identity as a fundamental characteristic of its citizens. This innovation is long overdue and is already recognized at the level of common sense and practiced in everyday life. Public opinion polls and everyday practices of Russian citizens show that their civic and state affiliation and the recognition of their Rossiyan-ness is more important to them than their ethnic affiliation.

Some current proposals are unfeasible to affirm in Russia the notion of not a ‘Rossiyan’ but a ‘Russian’ nation and to reanimate the pre-revolutionary notion of “Russians” as all those who consider themselves to be so. Ukrainians and Belarusians living in Russia will never agree to be called Russians again, while Tatars or Chechens have never identified themselves as Russians. Yet, all these and other ethnic groups in this country view themselves as Rossiyan. The prestige of Russian-ness and the status of Russians can and must be enhanced not by rejecting Rossiyan-ness but by affirming the double (Russian and Rossiyan) identity; by improving living conditions in regions largely populated by ethnic Russians; and finally, by promoting their social and political representation in the Russian state.

Modern states have come to acknowledge multiple and non-exclusive identities at the community and individual level. This weakens ethno-cultural borderlines within co-citizenship and promotes national consolidation. In addition, it more adequately reflects the self-consciousness of people born of mixed marriages. In Russia, where one-third of its people come from mixed couples, there still persists the practice of mandatory registration of a single ethnic affiliation. This practice results in personal violence and in heated debates about ethnic affiliation. In order to promote national consolidation and better reflect the ethno-religious diversity of Russia’s citizens, the forthcoming population census should allow for the registration of multiple ethnic affiliations.

In the light of the new doctrine, there should be no strict limitations on the use of the word ‘nation.’ At the same time, the state should refer to national priorities and strategic national interests as “national policy,” while the policy of sustaining and managing the country’s ethno-cultural diversity should be termed as ethnic or ethno-cultural policy.

Today, all states in the world consider themselves nation states, and Russia has no grounds to be an exception. A ubiquitous effort is underway across the globe to establish the concept of a nation as free from racial, ethnic or religious dimensions. A nation is forged as the result of a sustained effort on the part of any given country’s political and intellectual elites, articulating and disseminating their self-perception as a unified nation with a common set of values, symbols and aspirations, rather than striving to achieve ethno-cultural uniformity.

Such general views exist in countries with a more disunited population than that of Russia, whereas Russia features a real community of Rossiyan nationals (Rossiyane) sharing a single set of historical and social values, patriotism, culture and language. However, a large part of the Russian elite seek to deny this community, so there is an urgent need to change the situation. National identity can be developed through a host of tools and strategies, with the primary objectives being to assure civic
equity, pursue education and awareness programs, cultivate the state language, develop the symbols and calendar, and sustain cultural and mass-media activities. Following the completion of crucial political and economic reforms, Russia now needs to review its ideological and doctrinal documents underpinning the ongoing effort to achieve civic solidarity and national identity.

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National Identity of Poles

The idea of nation that had emerged in XVIII century, alongside with French Revolution, from the very beginning was related to the state. It was the process of state formation and the rise of bureaucracy which gave birth to the development of the idea of nationhood and nationality (Gellner 1983, Breuilly 1985, Hobsbawm 1992). The importance of this fact becomes obvious when one recalls that in XVIII century most of the present states of Mid-Eastern Europe did not exist as independent political entities, and the rest of them (Poland, Czech, Hungary) lost their independence soon thereafter. This did not stop the development of the idea of nationality in the region, but has given to it a direction different than in the countries of Western Europe. The difference is sometimes encapsulated in saying that in Western Europe states were creating nations whereas in Eastern Europe nations were creating states (see Jankovsky 1945, Kohn 1945).

Although attractive, thanks to its simplicity such distinction does not answer the question which immediately arises from it - but who or what was creating nations in the second case? What were the moving factors hidden behind the formation of “eastern version” of national identities? In the case of Poland the answers to such questions seem obvious – it was religion which saved Poles from dissolving their identity in the sea of surrounding nationalities and which has also played the most important role in moulding it during the communist times.

The conviction that religion is an important – if not the most important – element in the contemporary national identity of Poles is well supported by empirical data. A very high and stable over the long time percentage of people declare themselves to be Catholics. It is also reinforced by the results of statistical analyses showing that Polish data do not fit the expected pattern of behaviour under conditions of enforced secularization (Muellemann 2004). Last but not least it is backed by declarations of many politicians for whom the religiosity of Polish society is not only a key feature of national identity but constitutes the uniqueness of Poles among the other nations of Europe (Jasíńska-Kania, Marody 2004). Those politicians would eagerly sign their names under the findings formulated by those researchers, according to whom “Catholicism in Poland as a pledge of national identity has not only resisted the Communist attack on religion, but held the position of religion against secularism in general” (Muellemann 2004: 52; see also Pollack 2001: 141-143, 154-155).

However, the results of deeper analyses of Polish religiosity challenge the absence of secularization processes in Poland (Marody 2004, Mandes 2004). In the society composed almost entirely of Catholics, the attitudes towards the Church are close to anticlerical and many of everyday practices accepted by huge segments of population contradict values stressed by the Catholic Church. It is not also true that a high level of religiosity is unique or specific to Poles. According to the data from the European Values Study, a relatively high percentage of persons defining themselves as religious characterizes the majority of Western European countries, and, in this respect, the case of Poland is more similar to Western societies than to the other post-communist ones, which were subjected to enforced secularisation. But although many European nations (for example, Germans, Finns, and Danish) have high percentage of people who declare their belonging to religion denomination (76-90%), we have not ever heard that religion is a “pledge of their national identity”.

Moreover, in terms of the percentage of people who declare belonging to a religious denomination, Poland occupies only the 5th place among 6 European countries in which this indicator is higher than 90%. Those six European countries that in 1999 had the highest percentage of believers seem completely different in all aspects except one - they were not independent for a long time or lost their

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sovereignty at the turn of the XVIII and XIX century\textsuperscript{7}. With all the differences in their history, it looks as if the absence of independent state in the time of formation of national identity has brought to them at least one common effect: froze the percentage of believers at the level characteristic for more traditional societies.

Thus, to understand the role played by religion in national identity of Poles we should ask about the relation between those two phenomena. It is shaped, first of all, by some functional similarities of religion and nationalism as stressed by Hajo Funke who points to the fact that “they both integrate social groups in a supra-individual entity and make individual existence valuable; both indicate to their adherents specific roles in their environment; both suggest the foundation of morality, the normative basis for the people’s life together, require from people a distinct responsibility, and propose a pattern for the imposition or forgiveness of guilt.” (1991: 115). For centauries religion was the prime basis for the most general collective identity integrating Us against the Others. As it was shown by Émile Durkheim in his well-known book \textit{The Elementary Forms of Religious Life} (2001), it was able to accomplish such a function mainly through religious rituals, that allowed people to recognize themselves as community, to entertain collective sentiments and express a sense of social unity.

With the advent of modernization the place of religion was taken over by the idea of nationhood. In institutionalized sphere, the Church had to give way to the state as the main mediator between collective actors (Gauchet 1997). The religious rituals were replaced by rituals of various “secular religions”, which according to Serge Moscovici were “one of the discoveries of the French Revolution, and Robespierre was the first to see them as a powerful way of regenerating a nation and an instrument enabling him to make Republic replace the monarchy completely.” (1985: 354-5). The public sphere “has come more and more dominated by civic creeds and ideologies with only vague religious content or sometimes no such content at all” (Berger, Berger, Kellner 1977: 76).

Or at least it was so in Western Europe, and more specifically, in those its regions where major ethnic groups were organized in independent states at the threshold of modern era. In other regions, religion could preserve its specific functions of integrating the collectivity and its special place in public life\textsuperscript{8}. The case of Poland is quite illustrative in this respect.

It is easy to show that the modern history of Poland has prevented the development of all the rituals in public sphere with the exception of only one -- that connected to religion. In the XVIII and XIX century, when in Western countries the concept of nation as the dominant community was shaped, Poland was under Partitions and had no opportunity to develop the modern understanding of its nationhood. The feeling of national identity was based then on distinct language and religion, that is, its base was ethnicity rather than politically organized nation. In XX century, brief period of independence was simply too short to accomplish the formation of modern national identity. It was followed by German occupation which suppressed all expressions of nationalistic feelings, and, then, communist regime which tried to install very specific understanding of national idea. According to it the Polish nation appeared to be incapable of politically independent existence in the divided and hostile world and had to depend on Soviet Union. (Michel 1988).

During the whole period of communism public sphere was strictly controlled by the communist party and churches were the only niche in which rituals, preserving the pre-communist, romantic model of nationality, could be performed. The initial moment when that control was lifted was the first pilgrimage of the Polish Pope in Poland in June 1979. In popular opinion the Polish Pope embodied all the positive features of the nation and the election of Karol Wojtyła was received as the elevation of the whole nation to its due position. One should not forget, however, that under such circumstances this position has been still based on religion, or, in other words, the Poles felt to deserve it most of all because they have remained Catholics even under the communist regime. This, in turn, refreshed old topos of the XIX-century romantic nationalism\textsuperscript{9}. Especially, that the Pope John Paul II himself often recalled the ideas of romantic nationalism in the sermons preached during his pilgrimages to Poland (see: Michel 1988).

\textsuperscript{7} We would like to thank Professor Hans Dieter Klingemann, who called our attention to that fact during the EVS conference in Warsaw 2004, when we presented first draft of the text on relations between religion and Polish national identity. Besides Poland those six countries are Malta, Greece, Romania, Iceland, and Ireland.

\textsuperscript{8} It is obvious that political independence was only one of the factors influencing the specific transformations of religiosity and its relations with national identity in particular countries. There are many nations that did not have independent state at the threshold of modern era but have now low (e.g. Czech, Hungary) or moderate level of religiosity (e.g. Italy). In this short text, focused on the case of Poland, we are unable to systematically consider under which specific conditions religion did preserve its integration functions and what were the other factors which have influenced the transformations of religiosity in countries other than Poland.

\textsuperscript{9} XIX-century romantic poets, Adam Mickiewicz and Zygmunt Krasiński, defined Polish nation in terms of Messiah of other nations deprived of independence, whose destiny was to fulfill a special mission in history. Another Polish romantic poet, Juliusz Słowacki, prophetically wrote about the election of a Slavic Pope in one of his poems. The election of Karol Wojtyła could be easily inscribed into existing cultural pattern: living in the „darkness of communism“ nations were to be liberated (i.e. redeemed) by Poland.
1988). He separated the nation from the state, and in his sermons the “Nation” became a fundamental and autonomous form of Polish identity\(^\text{10}\). The primary feature of the Nation was its religiosity and due to this feature Poland was also to perform an important role in the Pope’s program of re-evangelizing Western Europe (Byrnes 2001).

The Polish Pope became an icon of collective identity of Poles and as long as he lived, this identity could manifest itself mainly through religious rituals. His death has broken the long lasting relationship between national and religious identities of Poles. For above two centuries those identities has shaped and reinforced each other. Now they can separate themselves and form independently.

As to the possible transformation of Polish religiosity, since some time empirical data have shown that it is changing in accordance with modernization regularities: Polish society becomes more secularized, at least in this sense that it wants to restrict the role of the Church to strictly religious matters. Between 1980 and 2008, the percentage of people who recognize themselves as religious fell from 96 to 88% and from 52% to 35% decreased the percentage of persons who are of the opinion that the Church is giving adequate answers to social problems facing the country. The religious beliefs of people become also more selective.

The possible transformation of Polish national identity is a much more complex matter. Generally, one can say that national identity – as any other collective one – is based on social bonds which are emerging in the course of cooperation or co-activity in public sphere. The enlargement of the European Union has established new framework for such a co-operation by introducing new institutional structures and new actors into the public sphere of Polish society and by introducing Poles into the public spheres of other societies. So the national identity of Poles will be now shaped not only by the participation in traditional religious rituals but also by activities and bonds established in this enlarged public sphere that has its own, secular rituals.

References


\(^{10}\) It is clearly seen in the following fragment of the Pope’s sermon: „Poland has the right to the state sovereignty (…). Polish nation paid a great price to acknowledge its rights to be an independent host on the Land inherited from its ancestors“ (quoted after Michel 1988).
National Identities in Ukraine and History Construction

Introduction
Nowadays research into identities is certain to be extremely relevant for the Ukrainian society, since identities can serve as a factor in reality construction. Therefore sociological measurement of identities might be viewed as a possibility to get insight into cultural codes we could apply to, when provoking or mitigating manifestations of conflicts. One way to find out cultural codes is to study peculiarities of how history events are perceived and interpreted. That is why we intent to undertake a holistic insight into the issue of national identities and construction of history.

In the given paper we propose to analyze national identities in Ukraine in correlation with history construction through applying to a number of findings obtained in the course of quantitative and qualitative sociological investigations.

National identities in Ukraine: some findings of quantitative research
The data gathered in the process of quantitative sociological research in Ukraine reveal that transformation of identities tends to be linked with the increasing development of a national identity component. This tendency can be testified by the results of sociological monitoring “Ukrainian society: 1994-2008” (Golovakha / Panina 2008:35, see table 1).

Table 1: Who do you think you are mainly? (Ukraine, n=1800, %)

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Resident of a village, district, town or city you live in</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>24.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Resident of a region (oblast) you live in</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen of Ukraine</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>54.6</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>51.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representative of an ethnic group, nation</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen of the former USSR</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen of Europe</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen of the world</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
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In formulating variants of response to the question, the classification of the population according to the type of national identification was used: “regionalists” (those who, first of all, consider themselves as residents of their region – village, district, town, etc), “citizens” (a citizen of Ukraine), “nationalists” (representatives of an ethnic group, nation), “nostalgists” (citizens of the former Soviet Union), “cosmopolitans” (citizens of Europe or the world) (Golovakha / Panina 2007). The data in the table distinctly show an increase in the national component.

There are other variants of identity measurement. Thus, in the course of the sociological monitoring “Ukrainian society” in 2005 (N=1800), a technique for measuring “we-identifications” was applied, which had previously been proposed by a group of Polish sociologists and underwent a further probation in Russia. The question posed was, “Who out of the given groups can you refer to as ‘It is we?’” As variants for possible responses the following answers were suggested (the proportion of respondents preferring this or that group is given in brackets as “It seems to me I can say it’s ‘we’” and “I’m sure to say it’s ‘we’”) (Ivashchenko 2007):

‘Citizens of Ukraine’ (82.6%).

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‘those whose welfare level is the same as mine’ (76.5%),
‘those who live in our residential area’ (76.1%),
‘those whose nationality is the same as mine’ (74.1%),
‘Slavs’ (73.6%),
‘those sharing the same confession with me’ (70.8%),
‘those who adhere to Ukrainian folk traditions’ (65%),
‘those whose profession is the same as mine’ (61.2%),
‘those who belong to the middle class’ (60%),
‘those who have achieved a success’ (57.8%),
‘those whose opinions are close to ours’ (53.4%),
‘Soviet people’ (51%),
‘those who share European values’ (49.3%),
‘those who are in need’ (47.8%).

As we see, in this variant of measurement national identities prove to be dominant, too. A somewhat similar technique has been applied in conducting the qualitative research (particular results of the latter will be considered below). Yet, here one can find a series of distinct differences. First, the research was qualitative rather than quantitative (the respondents were involved in the in-depth task-oriented interviews). Second, along with the open question “For you, who are ‘we’ or ‘ours’, who are ‘they’ or ‘not ours’?”, one could discern semantic characteristics of “we-identifications” when analyzing the narratives about significant historic events and the events related to interpretation conflict. Our suggestion to look at certain obtained results in a more detailed way is stated below.

History construction: from interpretation of conflict to socio-cultural formation of identities

"Construction" of a new history can be regarded as a factor that influences the construction of new identities. How powerful is this influence and how do educational and everyday discourses interact? Where does a sharp alteration of "narratives about conflict" lead to?

Under conditions of contemporary social alterations it has a special importance, since in the official discourse the history of the USSR has been replaced by the histories of new independent states, which differ essentially both from the previous history and from each other. Moreover, on the one hand society social institutions (educational institution, mass media and so on) construct a history, being chiefly repeaters of a legitimate discourse, determined by a dominant ideology. On the other hand, at the level of everyday practices a node of various discourses can be fixed, since we take into account both an oral history, retranslated by means of the family institution and other sources forming concepts of some or other events, which may contain different assessments of key historical facts (or myths about them).

In the research project "Construction’ of history: from conflict of interpretation to formation of new identities in conditions of The Land Between" a lingua-conflictological approach (through the linguertextual conflict research) educes tendencies of social changes through the conflict language study. It is considered both as a means of communication and a means of interpretation. While analyzing peculiarities of the history construction as a factor of forming new identities, the conflict language is regarded first and foremost as a means of interpretation.

A detailed description of methodology and techniques, as well as the outcomes of the lingualconflictological research (including the textual interview excerpts) can be found in the book “The Language of Conflict in the Transforming Society: from Construction of History to Formation of Socio-Cultural Identities in Ukraine” (Danylenko 2007). Here, we intent to take a brief look only at the major outcomes relevant for the problems covered in the given paper.

In the period of October, 2005 - March, 2006 our research team took 96 in-depth task-oriented interviews with the representatives of different generations in the East and West of Ukraine (Kharkiv, Lviv) and experts (Kiev, Kharkiv, Lviv, the Crimea). Moreover, as the material for the analysis of ‘legitimate discourse’ and its alterations, the content-analysis was conducted of approximately 200 history textbooks recommended to be used in secondary schools and higher educational establishments of Ukraine within the period of 1918 – 2005.

12 This article is based on the results of the research project "'Construction' of history: from conflict of interpretation to formation of new identities in conditions of The Land Between" conducted in July 2005 - June 2006 in Ukraine under the leadership of Oksana Danylenko in the scope of the program “Social Transformation in The Land Between – Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova” supported by Carnegie Corporation of New York.
The obtained results represent the corpus of various conflict potential texts. In carrying out the in-depth task-oriented interviews, the focus is made on the four generations representing definite social and cultural characteristics:

Generation 1 is represented by contemporary students perceiving history mainly through the "Independent Ukraine" ("Nezalezhna Ukraina") discourse;

Generation 2 is represented by "the Perestroika" (The Reconstruction) children; these are the representatives of the 1990s who got to know both the history of the USSR (mainly at school) and Ukraine (at the university) during their studies;

Generation 3 is represented by "the Soviet generation". In the secondary and higher education epoch the representatives of this generation experienced the domination of the Soviet discourse, and on the higher educational level its predomination;

Generation 4 is represented by the older generation who experienced World War II and the Great Patriotic War, witnessed these events, and is a major media of 'the oral history' of these events.

Specific characteristics of the historical memory for each generation were revealed, the specific character of the educational and everyday discourse combination was analyzed. Besides, regional peculiarities of the West and the East of Ukraine (for instance, Kharkiv and Lviv) were detected.

With reference to the linguistic and conflictological identity markers the results of the research are the following:

One of the key topics was "Name three historical events, which you consider to be the most significant. Characterize each of these events: the content of the event, participants etc. What happened, how it happened, i.e. the chronicle of events." The investigated issues were: Which events were particularly stressed, how they were described and estimated through the framework for the understanding of "justice" and some differences in its understanding by Lviv and Kharkiv citizens.

The Lviv citizens considered the following events to be significant (the basic nominations are assigned to those prevailed by events, in brackets there are other variants of the event name and the related to it events):

1. "The Orange Revolution" ("Our revolution of the previous year", "pomaranch revolution", "autumn-winter of 2004 (it was the revolution)").
2. "1991 was the year of gaining independence for Ukraine" ("Ukrainian independence", "the collapse of the USSR", "GKChP" ("GCES" – the Governmental Committee on Emergency State), "deciding Ukraine’s destiny in Belovezh Pustcha", "it was 1991 when the referendum was held and Ukraine actually became independent in a short time").
3. "World War II" ("The Great Patriotic War", "The UPA (The Ukrainian Rebellious Army) activities")

The most significant historical events presented in the interview scripts with the Kharkiv citizens are the following (the events are arranged by the frequency of the usage, the dominating nomination with each of the three events is provided as a basic one):

1. 'The Great Patriotic War', ("the war", "the war against Germany", "World War II", "The Patriotic War", "the war-time heroic events", "the Victory", "The Victory over the Fascist Germany");

As evident from the above mentioned list the dyads "The collapse of the Soviet Union – The Independence of Ukraine" and "The Great Patriotic War – World War II", vividly stress particular historical events falling into the same event loop.

In the narratives related to the oral history the following plots proved to be dominating for Kharkiv citizens: "The Great Patriotic War" as a just and liberation war against the fascism (at the same time many interviews contained stories about a positive treatment of Kharkiv citizens by the German soldiers), "the collectivization", "dispossession", "famine" (1933 and 1946), about arrests and represisions, about the construction (of plants, railroads, cities, towns, etc), plots about Stalin’s death, issues on the personality cult and its cultivation, "about Granddad’s Komsomol youth". The Soviet generation stories are characterized by the prevailing metaphor of construction and the joy of victory. Kharkiv generations 3 and 4 express no variant for the Soviet period, the life in the Soviet Union is considered to be the time of labor and achievements. In the light of recollections 'the Soviet past' image appears to be rather positive, though some negative aspects can be detected related to represisions, starvation and dispossession. The war related stories are dominated by "we’ve won", "we’ve held out".
and the recollections of the victory joy: "we’ve won", "we’ve restored and rebuilt the destroyed cities and towns" (it is mainly peculiar to generations 2-4 and to a lesser degree for generation 1).

The most frequently met plots of the oral history found in the stories of Lviv inhabitants are the following: the Communist party a variant (for instance, about Granddad’s changing different jobs, caused by the unwillingness to join the party, and grandmother’s failing to get a top executive position because of the unwillingness to join the party); stories about the starvation horrors, stories about the cruelty of "the NKVD" (People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs), World War II and the Great Patriotic War (about grandfather’s serving in the Soviet Army), about the UPA, about grandmother’s avoiding talks about the UPA in the postwar time, etc. and the plot about Stalin’s death.

Besides, the oral history plots of Kharkiv inhabitants present the idea that "the life before war had gone right, but the war destroyed everything at once". The ‘destruction’ was caused by the fascist German aggression. The Lviv experience of this "destruction" is related to (according to the analysis results of the text interviews) both the beginning of the Soviet era and ‘the NKVD’, and also to the war against the fascists, though the pre-war "Polish period" is also negatively considered. Here the story prevailed that every new regime raised hopes for a better life which was later followed by a new frustration. The dream about a unified and independent Ukraine can also be traced in these stories. The analysis of the oral history plots in the interview scripts has shown that historical and cultural preconditions of formation of identities define mainly various ideas of justice with Lviv and Kharkiv inhabitants when estimating World War II events and the participation of the Soviet Army and the UPA in it.

One more question put in the course of the in-depth task-oriented interviews was "For you, who are ‘we’ or ‘ours’, who are ‘they’ or ‘not ours’?"

Both in the Kharkiv residents’ narratives about the events and in their perception of ‘ours’ and ‘not ours’, one could trace a "class" approach ("ours" means “common people”, “working people”, whereas “not ours” – “nouveau riches” and other similar statements) rather than a “national” one. As for the dominant statements related to a generalized image, they include the following: “ours, those who I can rely on”, “the people within the close circle of mine”, “decent people”, and “my friends”. Moreover, there are a number of statements characterizing accentuation of national identities: “We” stands for Ukraine, our state (generation 3), “We”, probably, refers to Ukrainian people. … A people of Ukraine, citizens of Ukraine…. It doesn’t matter where they are living now – in Germany, America, or Canada. Well, citizens of Ukraine…. “Ours” means Ukraine, our country (generation 1). Also, in a number of statements the inhabitants of Kharkiv emphasize their identity with Slavs and the former Soviet Union residents: Russia, Belarus, those who belonged to the Union are “we”, i.e. we make up a single large country, we all are Slavs, we are supposed to be “we” (generation 1)…."We" are Slaves, “ours” means Russians, “we” are people sharing the same ideas, “we” means family, “ours” means those who can support a person close to us and to our opinion, those who have similar viewpoint, but whose interests are somehow different from ours (generation 2).

The Lviv residents have the most noticeable identity accentuation of "a citizen of Ukraine" and “the people of Ukraine" (“We are all who live in this state” (generation 2); "We are Ukrainian patriots" (generation 3); “For me ‘we’ means a people of Ukraine as a whole (generation 3); “For me ‘we’ is a people of Ukraine, and no doubt it is really so. This is the case both in the west and in the east, as well as both in the centre and everywhere. As for ‘not ours’, they are those who pose obstacles for this people to live together. That is why without any hesitation I take those who divide Ukraine into this or that kind of people as aliens” (generation 3). Also, quite numerous are the phrases “We are patriots of Ukraine” and “We are those who love Ukraine”. The idea of independence, struggle for independence and preservation of independence can also be referred to as central in many of Lviv residents’ statements: "We are the people who are aware of their attachment to the Ukrainian nation, who have a sense of patriotism, who create no threat to our state independence, either in terms of politics or language...”

Accentuation of attention to perceiving oneself as “a citizen of Ukraine” becomes much more noticeable in the interviews with Kharkiv residents of generation 1 than with those of generations 2, 3, 4. This correlates with the findings of quantitative sociological research, particularly with the results of the sociological monitoring (Golovakha / Panina 2008) revealing the growth of this very component in determining identities (see table 1 above). However, in the likeliness or “non-controversial discrepancies” of the statements associated with identities and correlated with the quantitative research findings show an increase in nation self-identification. One might discern the statements which contradict each other and are hardly compatible. For example: “A lot of residents of Ukraine treat Russia as a friendly, related country. After all, once we belonged to Russia” (generation 4, Kharkiv), “Russia, Belarus, those who were in the Union are ‘we’, i.e. we all are one large country, we all are Slavs” (generation 1) on the one hand; and “We” are the people of Ukraine, Ukrainians, West-Ukrainian provinces, while ‘they’ are Russians, Belarusians” (generation 1, Lviv) on the other hand. But
at the level of everyday practices all these variants get dissolved in identities “a citizen of Ukraine” without discriminating each other until they come to be involved in constructing conflicts in political manipulations. This consistency results from the fact that the most of conflict language characteristics, which incompatibly contradict each other, appear as if they were “inserted” into the narrative text, correlating with these or those text excerpts which serve as carriers of legitimate discourse (mass media, history textbooks, etc). Yet the characteristics of the “conflict language”, which are related to their “natural origin” (oral history plots, personal memoirs), have much more in common and (though not always!) have a far more peaceful character.

The results of the undertaken research “Construction’ of history: from conflict of interpretation to formation of new identities in conditions of The Land Between” demonstrate interrelation between the image of the past and formation of the image of the future. This can be illustrated by the blueprints of the conflict metalanguage of tertiary education students in Kharkiv and Lviv, as well as by a collection of cases about “three significant events” presented in the book “The Language of Conflict in the Transforming Society: from Construction of History to Formation of Socio-Cultural Identities in Ukraine” (Danylenko 2007). A distinct frame of references, whereby residents of Lviv and Kharkiv perceive history, determine to a great extent the orientation toward Russia or the European Union in terms of inhabitants of Kharkiv as representatives of Eastern Ukraine and in terms of residents of Lviv as representatives of Western Ukraine. The findings of quantitative and qualitative investigations also record regional peculiarities of geopolitical orientations. Thus, while interpreting the data obtained in sociological monitoring, N. Panina notes that despite the fact that the eastern vector remains dominant for Ukraine in general, there are distinct regional discrepancies concerning the union of Ukraine with Russia and Belarus (this idea has found support by 77% of the population in the eastern regions, in the southern regions – by 71%, in the centre – by 43%, in the western regions – by 18% of the population). The “idea that Ukraine should join the union with Russia and Belarus” is taken negatively by 7% of the population in the eastern regions, by 14% – in the south, by 38% – in the center, and by 41% – in the western regions (Panina 2005). At the same time, the data of sociological research record the fact that the number of inhabitants of Ukraine who feel themselves as residents of their own regions, of the former USSR or citizens of Europe is in decrease; while an increasing number of the inhabitants do feel themselves as Ukrainian citizens (see table 1). Due to the dominance of identity “a citizen of Ukraine”, a diversity of other identity components (including the contradictory ones with conflict potential) as well as the discrepancies in geopolitical orientations in a variety of regions in Ukraine can cause no harm to the social system entirety.

Conclusion
Summarizing a handful of the presented findings of qualitative and quantitative sociological research, we can suggest that it is the differences between perceptions of the past and that of the future which provide a potential for Ukrainian nation to be formed as a multicultural nation with heterogeneous identities and versatile vectors of socio-cultural and geopolitical attachments. This kind of diversity is to constitute an additional constructive potential for statehood development, unless these discrepancies undergo artificial leveling, but rather act as complements of one another. Given “heterovector orientation in formation and cooperation of identities” match “unequally weighted fragmentation” (Pal Tamas) – when neither of fragments discriminates the other, (which correlates with the ideas such as by Arend Liphardt about “Democracy in Plural Societies”) – it will encourage nation-state and “genuine democracy” to develop. To this end, neither of variants of “two identities” in one Ukraine (after all, not “Two Ukraines” as Mykola Ryabchuk put it) must not dominate and be considered as the most correct one. A question arises: Does such formation of identities include conflict potential? If it does, it must be the positive conflict, which allows avoiding stagnation. This positive conflict won’t inflict any damage on social system entirety. On the contrary, it will maintain its viability, stimulating development. Any suppression of one of the variants of the forming and transforming identities can serve as a cause for conflict to transfer from a constructive sphere into a destructive one.

References

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Published by: Institute of Ethnology of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic
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Internet: http://www.eu.cas.cz/index.php?c=100&k=46
Editor-in-chief: Woltsch, Jiří
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Sociological Journal
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Publication dates: The journal is published 6 times annually (4 × in Czech, 2 × in English), ISSN 0038-0288
Published by: Institute of Sociology of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic
E-mail: srevieu@soc.cas.cz
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Published by: Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies, Trg Stjepana Radica 3, PP 294, 10000 Zagreb
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Internet: http://www.imin.hr/en/met/
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Editor-in-chief: Dojcinovic Nesic
Subject area: Issues of gender theory in the region, feminist thought, issues of difference, otherness, identity and minority issues from the women's and gender studies perspective.

Socionet – Professional Information Space for Social Scientists

Link: http://www.socionet.ru
Geographic coverage: Socionet provides a geographically dispersed database of scientific materials in the Social Sciences
Subjects: Social Sciences
Description: Socionet is the first Russian contribution to setting up an international network infrastructure of new generation that provides information support for research and education in the Social Sciences. Socionet has been developed independently in Russia within frameworks of the international projects RePEc (http://www.repec.org) and Open Archives Initiative (http://www.openarchives.org). Socionet provides some “added value” including a new platform for creating information resources and services addressed to professional communities. Socionet strives to accumulate practically all standardised descriptions of electronic publications and other Social Sciences resources in the common database, thus forming a common information space from numerous standardised materials. Development of the system has been funded by the Ford Foundation (http://www.fordfound.org). Socionet integrates information from many sites that belong to Russian and foreign scientific and educational institutions engaged in the international projects RePEc and the Open Archives Initiative. The database integrates descriptions of resources that are automatically added to the database after periodical accumulation of updates from sites of different organisations. The accumulation in most cases is carried out daily (in a general case this is regulated by the participants). Organisations make their decision whether
they should join this professional information space and include their electronic series (archives of electronic publications, online catalogues of scientific materials, etc.) in the RePEc/Socionet database. The size, content and regime of replenishment of the series depend on the organisations.

**Language:** Russian/English

**Access:** All Socionet resources and services are free.

**Scientific Electronic Library eLIBRARY.RU**

**Link:** [http://www.elibrary.ru](http://www.elibrary.ru)

**Geographic coverage:** international and national scope

**Subjects:** all academic disciplines

**Description:** Scientific Electronic Library, Ltd. (SEL in short) is a Russian information company. The venture was founded in 1998 under initiative of the Russian Foundation for Basic Research (RFBR). SEL provides a wide range of services to its clients: millions of citations/abstracts and fulltext publications, from sophisticated search facilities to personal profiles and reliable customer support services and even customer trainings. Thus thousands of foreign journals were downloaded into the online information retrieval system eLIBRARY.RU. The main information projects of Scientific Electronic Library today are: 1) The fulltext collection "Russian Scientific Journals Online". At the moment, this collection includes over 514 titles in fulltext format. Many of the journals (about 220) can be accessed free of charge for the end-users. 2) Russian Index of Science Citation, RISC. The project is developed under initiative of the Federal Agency on Science and Innovations (Rosnauka). Today the RISC database is being continually enlarged and renewed, every day newly published articles are added into the system. The total number of indexed journals in March 2008 exceeded 1300 titles. Political sciences are represented with a dozen of journals – 9 of them are free of charge and only 3 titles are chargeable.

**Language:** Russian. The search in English is provided.

**Access:** The UIS RUSSIA is available on equal basis and for free to all RF and CIS countries - 200+ universities and academic institutions, local, regional, federal agencies access the system as collective users, 2000+ specialists work as individual users. The access is free but registration is needed due to several commercial collections being provided for by the holders only for research and education purposes. Foreign social sciences specialists may also register to access. The collections allowed by holders for free dissemination are available for public use without registration.

**Virtual E-Library IQlib**

**Link:** [http://www.iqlib.ru/support/about.visp](http://www.iqlib.ru/support/about.visp)

**Geographic coverage:** international and national scope

**Subjects:** all academic disciplines

**Description:** The e-library offers full text publications of educational nature: textbooks, monographs, collections of scientific articles, information editions on history, economy, sociology, political science, etc.

**Language:** Russian

**Access:** free of charge, registration required.

**BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATABASES**

**CEJSH. The Central European Journal of Social Sciences and Humanitites**

**Link:** [http://cejsh.icm.edu.pl/](http://cejsh.icm.edu.pl/)

**Geographic coverage:** Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovak Republic

**Subjects:** Social Sciences and Humanitites

**Description:** CEJSH publishes English abstracts of articles and reviews, which appeared mostly in national languages in the Czech, Hungarian, Polish and Slovak scientific journals devoted to social sciences and humanities.
**CUBISS. Net**

Link: [http://www.cobiss.si/cobiss_eng.html](http://www.cobiss.si/cobiss_eng.html)

Geographic coverage: Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia.

Subjects: all disciplines

Description: COBISS.Net is a joint project of the institutions in Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia, which have taken on the responsibility for developing national library information systems and current research information systems. The linking between both systems is especially important to manage researchers' bibliographies and when evaluating research results. Cobiss offers bibliographic databases (particularly with regard to Slovenia under: [http://cobiss.izum.si/scripts/cobiss?ukaz=getid &lani=en](http://cobiss.izum.si/scripts/cobiss?ukaz=getid&lani=en))

Language: national languages

Access: free of charge

**Information Register of R&D Results (RIV)**


Geographic coverage: Czech Republic

Subjects: all disciplines

Description: RIV is part of the Czech R&D Information System. It collects information about results of R&D long-term intentions and R&D projects (publications, patents, applied results, other results such as electronic documents) supported by different state and other public budgets. The data are given into the RIV by all public sponsors (different ministries and other state offices with the responsibility for state R&D long-term intention financial aid and/or R&D project financial aid, the Grant Agency of the Czech Republic, the Academy of Science of the Czech Republic and local authorities). Searching in the R&D Information system can be made by the search program application: [http://aplikace.isvav.cvut.cz/prepareResultForm.do](http://aplikace.isvav.cvut.cz/prepareResultForm.do)

Language: English

Access: free of charge

**INION - Institute of Scientific Information for Social Sciences of the Russian Academy of Sciences**

Link: [http://www.inion.ru](http://www.inion.ru)

Geographic coverage: National and international scope

Subjects: Social Sciences and Humanities

Description: The databases of the Institute of Scientific Information on Social Sciences of the Russian Academy of Sciences (INION) rank among the renowned bibliographic databases in the field of social sciences and humanities. The databases were launched in the 80es and now provide access to approximately 2,5 million bibliographical records. The INION databases contain annotated bibliographic descriptions of the Soviet, Russian and foreign literature in all branches of social science and humanities, acquired by the INION library - the largest European library for social sciences and humanities. Each record is registered in its original language, includes brief abstract in Russian and keywords in Russian and English languages. The INION databases contain not only descriptions of monographs but articles from journals and collections of papers (more than 20 thousand items), dissertation abstracts, conference proceedings and "grey" literature as well. The INION databases are available on CD-ROM with INION software and an interface in Russian and English. INION supplies users with electronic copies of articles from journals and monographs.

Language: The search language is Russian and English.

Access: The search is free of charge, the ordering requires payment.

**Serbian Citation Index**

Link: [http://scindeks.nb.rs/static/about.aspx?lang=en](http://scindeks.nb.rs/static/about.aspx?lang=en)

Geographic coverage: Serbia

Subjects: all disciplines

Description: SCIndeks is the Serbian national citation index, developed to serve as an add-on to the international (Thompson-ISI) citation indexes. It is indexing locally published journals classified as periodicals of scientific character. All of the journals listed are indexed on cover-to-cover basis. In addition to basic article descriptions, SCIndeks contains abstracts and references/citations (metadata) for all articles. Articles from the journals of a certain level of quality which accepted Open Access as a publishing model, are available as full texts.

Language: English

Access: free of charge
SzozioWeb. Database of the Hungarian sociological literature

Link: http://database.fszek.hu:2009/szocopt/szoc0402.htm?v=szoc&a=start&a1

Geographic coverage: National scope

Subjects: Sociology

Description: The database represents the Hungarian and Hungary-related foreign literature published between 1970 /occasionally earlier/ and 2006, and offers a selection from nearly 120,000 bibliographical items - articles, special issues, books and sets of books. The items have only a short description, because the database is continuously updated.

Language: Hungarian or in other languages.

Access: The search is free of charge, the ordering requires payment.

INTERNETLINKS

Russian Public Opinion Research Center: http://wciom.com/
In its current form, the Center was created in 1998 to undertake public opinion monitoring in the Russian Federation. It uses a number of established surveying tools to investigate trends in public opinion on a wide variety of issues, eg. rating of political parties, social problems, way of life. The website contains brief details of the methodology underpinning their different survey products and a summary of the contents of their principal journal publication "Monitoring obshchestvennogo mneniya: ekonomicheskie i sotsial'nye peremeny". The site is available in Russian or English.

The Public Opinion Foundation: http://www.fom.ru/
The Public Opinion Foundation conducts and disseminates the results of Russian public opinion poll monitoring. The organisation uses a wide variety of established surveying tools to investigate the public's attitude to current political, social and economic issues and events. This includes coverage of recent presidential and parliamentary elections. There is also a searchable archive of surveys dating back to 1996. While many of the surveys' results are available, there is a separate section for subscribers where additional material is held. The site is available in both Russian and English language variants, with the former being the more comprehensive. Topics covered include: surveys on Russia's image in the world; political trends and ratings on Russian political attitudes.

Slovenian Data Archive (ADP):
http://www.adp.fdv.uni-lj.si/rezultati_iskanja/?cx=014574041986919778471%3Acmxlmelohks&cof=FORID%3A11&ie=UTF-8&q=identity&sa=Iskanje#970
The ADP offers 26 studies to the topic national identities.