THE ROLE OF IDENTITY IN SUPPORT FOR SUPRANATIONAL INTEGRATION IN EU FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICIES

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Research Question

Are states whose constituencies have higher levels of self-identification with Europe more likely to willingly give up some of their sovereign rights and veto power to a more encompassing entity and support supranational integration on foreign and defence policies?

Hypotheses

1) States with higher levels of European and EU identification are more likely to support supranational cooperation in the CFSP.
   1a) State support for supranational integration in foreign and security policies derives from public support for supranational integration in those policy areas.
   1b) Public support for supranational integration in foreign and security policies derives from individual self-identification with Europe.

Operationalization and Measurement of Variables

Dependent Variable and Case Selection
DV: state preference for supranational cooperation on foreign policy
State positions on proposals regarding supranationalization of CFSP and ESDP in three conferences:
Series of IGCs convened prior to the three major treaty reforms: Maastricht; Amsterdam; and Constitutional treaties
Each fully supportive position is given 2 points while no support, -1 points. Additionally, two intermediary positions are defined:
- 'Reluctant yes/conditional yes position' is coded 1 point
- 'Reluctant/no change' is coded 0.

Intervening Variables
Public support for joint decision-making in foreign and defence policies
Three EB surveys, each conducted during the peak of the negotiations, are analyzed:
- EB 35, published in June 1991
- EB 46 published in May 1997
- EB 58 published in December 2002

Independent Variable
IV: Level of European identification
EB Question: "In the near future, do you see yourself as:
- (nationality) only;
- (nationality) and European;
- European and [nationality]; or
- European only?"

Operationalization: Two Models

Model I: Individual Level Analysis (fixed effects logit regression)
- Perception of Benefits from Membership
- General Support for Membership
- Trust in US/Americans
- Left/Right Positioning
- Education
- Age
- Income

Model II: Country Level Analysis (OLS regression)
- Support for Joint Decision-Making in Defence
- Support for Joint Decision-Making in Foreign Policy
- Trust in the US/Americans
- Perception of Benefits from membership
- GDP
- Inflation

Proposals on Further Supranationalization of FP and Defence

Maastricht
1. Introducing more QMV for decisions of principle
2. Introducing more QMV for decisions of implementation
3. Increasing the powers of the European Commission in foreign policymaking
4. Bringing foreign policy cooperation under the Community pillar, ‘tree model’ vs. ‘temple’ pillar structure
5. Adopting a common defence clause

Amsterdam
1. Introducing more QMV for decisions of principle
2. Introducing more QMV for decisions of implementation
3. Increasing the powers of the European Commission in CFSP
4. Increasing the powers of the European Parliament in CFSP
5. Establishing new supranational institutions at the EU level regarding CFSP
6. Integration of the WEU to the EU

Constitutional
1. Introducing more QMV on CFSP and ESDP
2. Institutionalizing the posts of Presidency of the European Council and Ministry for Foreign Affairs in a supranational format
3. Effective utilization of ‘enhanced cooperation’ mechanisms in CFSP and ESDP
4. Adopting a mutual assistance clause
5. Establishing new supranational institutions at the EU level regarding CFSP and ESDP

Findings: A Two-Level Game

Model I: Strong government responsiveness to public opinion in all three IGCs
Model II: Strong government responsiveness to public opinion in all three IGCs

Findings: Model I
- Those with higher levels of European identification, those who believe their country has benefitted from membership and those evaluating the EU membership positively are more likely to support joint decision-making in both foreign policy and defence.
- A moderately significant effect is the level of trust in the United States. Individuals who have lesser opinion of Americans/the US are more supportive of joint decision-making in foreign and security policy, providing evidence that the Atlanticists vs Europenists divide is real and effective in forming opinion.
- Considering the effects of economic variables, the model reveals only weak statistical relationships

Findings: Model II
- High degrees of overlap between public support for joint decision-making in foreign and defence policies and state support for supranationalism
- Voter representativeness is positive and statistically significant
- The congruence between the public opinion and state positions is particularly strong over supranationalization of defence policies.
- Trust in US does not have considerable effect on state positions in Maastricht and Amsterdam, yet our analysis reveals that during the negotiation process of the Constitutional Treaty it was a highly significant factor in shaping support for supranationalism.