Cold War Revisited?

Germany and the renaissance of alliance defense

Gesis Lecture Series 2017/8
Mannheim, March 6, 2018
WHAT IS ZMSBW?

The Bundeswehr Center for Military History and Social Sciences

• is the central agency in the remit of the Federal Minister of Defense (FMOD) for research and education in the fields of military history and social sciences,

• provides subject-related assistance and support in the preparation, conduct and follow-up of Bundeswehr deployments,

• creates prerequisites for and provides knowledge for subject-related training and historical education in the Armed Forces

• prepares subject-related studies and expert reports for the FMOD

• exercises administrative control over the Bundeswehr Museum of Military History and ensures that it accomplishes its mission.
MILITARY SOCIOLOGY AT ZMSBW

• Bundeswehr and Society:
  – Annual population survey
  – Publications and reports

• Personnel and organization:
  – Surveys in the Armed Forces
  – Contract research for FMOD

• Reorientation of the Armed Forces:
  – Integration of women
  – Internationalization/international cooperation

• Download reports @ www.zmsbw.de
STARTING POINT

• Changes in Germany’s security policy focus:
  – Before 1990: Focus on national and alliance defense, Germany at the frontline of the Cold War, support for Germany by other countries
  – After 1990: Increasing importance of foreign deployments out of area, decreasing importance of national and alliance defense
  – After 2014: Return of national and alliance defense (NATO-summits, White Paper 2016), support for other countries by Germany

• In democracies political decisions need support by citizens
  – Integration requirement of “Innere Führung”
  – Support for foreign deployments (e.g., Afghanistan, Mali) low to modest, how about deployments related to alliance defense?

• Not much research on attitudes towards alliance defense
  – Level of support for different actions of alliance defense?
  – Predictors of attitudes on alliance defense?
  – Results of a framing experiment on alliance defense
ALLIANCE DEFENSE UNTIL 2014

- North Atlantic Treaty, Article 5: requirement to come to the aid of any member state subject to an armed attack
- NATO Eastern Enlargement:
  - 29 members (incl. former members of the Warsaw Pact and parts of the Soviet Union)
  - Germany in the center, “surrounded by allies and friends”, regions of potential conflict have moved away from Germany’s borders
  - Low military abilities of new members (e.g., no air force in the Baltics)
- Significant disarmament (“peace dividend”)
- Partnership initiatives
- International crisis management (Yugoslavia, Afghanistan)
- Downsizing of abilities and troops for alliance defense
**ALLIANCE DEFENSE AFTER 2014**

- Warsaw and Wales Summits 2014/2016:
  - 2 percent goal (defense budget/GDP), 20 percent goal (investment/defense budget)
  - Enhanced Forward Presence

- New NATO Commands, e.g., for logistics in Europe (Bonn?)
- Very High Readyness Joint Task Force (5,000 troops, deployable in 48h)
DATA AND METHODS (1/2)

• Data of ZMSBw population survey 2017
• n: 2,508 respondents
• CAPI-survey
• Four main dependent variables:
  – Index “alliance defense”, based on 3 items: “The Bundeswehr should be deployed... 1) ... to help an ally who is threatened, 2) ... to help an ally who is under attack, 3) ... to use military force against countries which threaten Germany or allies.” (alpha=0.81)
  – “Military presence”: Attitude on increase of NATO military presence in Central and Eastern Europe
  – “Support for Baltic States”: Attitude on support by Germany for its allies in the Baltics in case of a potential threat by Russia
  – “Bundeswehr deployments”: Index on 2 items on current Bundeswehr deployments in the Baltics (Enhanced Forward Presence, Air Policing) (alpha=0.81)
DATA AND METHODS (2/2)

- Framing experiment on alliance defense (Split 5)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Label</th>
<th>Question wording</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Control group</td>
<td>“How do you evaluate the proposal to deploy the Bundeswehr to defend NATO allies in Eastern Europe in case of an external attack? Do you fully agree with the proposal, rather agree, partly agree/partly disagree, rather disagree, or fully disagree.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Plea by politicians</td>
<td>“Some German politicians have recently advocated that Germany has to fulfill its duties towards its allies to a stronger extent. How do you...”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>NATO Treaty</td>
<td>“According to the NATO Treaty Germany has an obligation to assist its allies in case of an external military attack. How do you...”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Cold War</td>
<td>“During the Cold War Germany’s allies committed themselves to assist Germany in case of an external military attack. How do you...”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Increasing tensions</td>
<td>“You might have heard about increasing tensions between NATO and Russia. How do you...”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
POTENTIAL EXPLANATORY FACTORS

- Resources: gender, age, education, income, migration background Russia, military experience
- Political attitudes: political interest, party orientations, ideology
- Threat and security perceptions: perceived threats (security, economic, ecological), security perceptions (worldwide, Germany, personal)
- Security policy attitudes: Perceptions of Russia, attitude towards Bundeswehr
- Foreign and security policy postures: Militarism, (NATO-)multilateralism, internationalism, atlanticism
ZMSBw-survey 2017. Mean values; sd: Index alliance defense: 0.22, Increase NATO military presence: 0.29, Military support for Baltic States: 0.29, Index Bundeswehr deployments: 0.26.
RESULTS (2/6)

Dependent variable: Index alliance defense

ZMSBw-survey 2017. OLS-regression, standardized (beta) coefficients. Other variables included, but not displayed. Adjusted $R^2$: 0.38, $n= 2,119$. 

0.36
0.29
0.10
0.09
0.09
0.08
0.07

NATO-multilateralism
Attitude towards Bundeswehr
Militarism
Security perception worldwide
Security perception Germany
Internationalism
Security perception personal
Atlanticism
RESULTS (3/6)

• Index alliance defense and index Bundeswehr deployments: positive evaluations of multilateralism and the German Armed Forces as clearly most important predictors.

• Increase NATO military presence, military support for Baltic states: mainly driven by perceptions of Russia: Critical view -> more support.

• Postures, threat and security perceptions relevant, but minor importance.

• Other analyses show that NATO deployments are not seen as special category of missions abroad. Evaluation and determinants of deployments out of area (e.g., in Afghanistan or Mali) are very similar.
### RESULTS (4/6): FRAMING EXPERIMENT

Table 8: Means and mean differences between different treatment groups in framing experiment on alliance defense

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 (Control)</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.06&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 (Plea by politicians)</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.06&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 (NATO Treaty)</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.08&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 (Cold War)</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.10&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 (Increasing tensions)</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data: ZMSBw-survey 2017.

Notes: Mean differences were calculated by subtracting the mean of the group with the higher number from the mean of the group with the lower number or from the total mean. Analysis of variance, Scheffé test. Levels of significance: a: p<0.05. b: p<0.01. c: p<0.001.

The Cold War and the NATO Treaty-treatments make a difference for supporting alliance defense.
RESULTS (5/6): FRAMING EXPERIMENT

Multivariate analysis, probability to belong to the respective group by treatment groups

- Increasing tensions: 4.6% fully disagree, 20.3% rather disagree, 45.6% partly agree/partly disagree, 26.4% rather agree, 3.1% fully agree
- Cold War: 1.8% fully disagree, 9.5% rather disagree, 36.6% partly agree/partly disagree, 44.3% rather agree, 7.7% fully agree
- NATO Treaty: 2.1% fully disagree, 11.0% rather disagree, 39.0% partly agree/partly disagree, 41.3% rather agree, 6.6% fully agree
- Plea by politicians: 2.6% fully disagree, 13.0% rather disagree, 41.6% partly agree/partly disagree, 37.3% rather agree, 5.4% fully agree
- Control group: 3.1% fully disagree, 15.1% rather disagree, 43.5% partly agree/partly disagree, 33.8% rather agree, 4.6% fully agree

Note: Based on ordinal logistic regressions with several control variables. All other variables are set to their means or modes.
RESULTS (6/6): FRAMING EXPERIMENT

• Consistent findings in bivariate and multivariate analyses: It makes a difference for Germans how alliance defense is framed.

• More support among people with “NATO Treaty” and “Cold War” treatments, lower support among those with “Increasing tensions” treatment. Even when controlling for a host of socio-demographics and attitudes!

• Germans are convinced by historical and judicial frames, in case of real-world increase of tensions high likelihood for decreasing support for allies.
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

• Gap in support between alliance defense in general and specific actions/measures of alliance defense: No broad consensus.
• Strong predictors of support: general attitude towards Bundeswehr, support for multilateralism (NATO) in general
• General evaluations of alliance defense not dependent on perceptions of Russia
• Attitudes on specific actions depend on a respondent’s evaluation of Russia: Higher relevance of the current security policy context
• Shortcomings
  – Framing experiment: simplification of reality
  – No test of moderator effects
• Necessity to bridge the gap between international demands and expectations and internal reservations and skepticism
• Lack of mobilization and initiative to convince Germans that vigilance is the prize for security and freedom.