Peter Fischer: Towards an Empirical Theory of Science? Lessons from the History of the Philosophy of Social Science. [Abstract]

While focusing on the possibilities of an empirical theory of science I question whether there are some lessons to be learned from the history of the philosophy of science. In a first step I reflect the complicated and somehow muddled relationship between the natural and social sciences with focus on Thomas Hobbes. He already learned that there are two types of research-objects which follow different logic: natural and social bodies. Within the process of the institutionalization of the social sciences one could see an ongoing import of metaphors and methods from the natural sciences, but no methodological compatibility between these two varieties of science. Therefore, a philosophy of science (Wissenschaftstheorie) in philosophy differs from the newer Philosophy of the Social Sciences; this could also be understood as an outcome of the increasing self-consciousness of the social sciences and their long-lasting tradition. Their history of the empirical observation of the world illustrates that – developing Hobbes thoughts further – there are not only natural and social bodies, but also mixed forms: socio-natural bodies. Here we meet limitations to social-science research, which will be outlined in short. I conclude with some remarks advocating for an empirical theory of science taking the research as a whole seriously and helping to understand what we do when we do social science.

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